Since ancient rabbis decided against including the books of Maccabees in the Hebrew Bible, there is, for post-talmudic Jews, no standard text telling the Hanukkah story. Thus, while Purim—the other major holiday of the Second Temple era—focuses on the public reading of Megillat Esther (the book, or literally, scroll, of Esther), there is no parallel on Hanukkah. A.J. Berkovitz investigates an attempt to create a text for this purpose, and its peculiar idiom:

[A]n author living in the mid to late first millennium CE composed the Megillat Antiochus (the Scroll of Antiochus; also known as “The Greek Scroll” and “The Scroll of the House of the Hasmoneans”), which presents itself as the narrative explaining the events leading up to Hanukkah. The author has little direct access to more historical sources like 1 and 2 Maccabees, and he uses biblical and rabbinic ones as well as his own expansions and Jewish collective memory to tell the story.

Megillat Antiochus . . . copies, draws on, riffs upon, and develops the language and narrative style of the books of Daniel, Ezra, and Esther to enrich and inform its overarching narrative.

The book never could have become part of the Tanakh; the Jewish biblical canon was closed well before Megillat Antiochus was conceived. Nevertheless, the text convinced the author of the 9th-century Sefer Halakhot G’dolot of its ancient pedigree. . . . Some medieval scribes also copied Megillat Antiochus into biblical codices; . . . the Italian rite included the liturgical recitation of Megillat Antiochus on Hanukkah.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.