“Spiritual but Not Religious” Remains a Niche Category

For experts on religious demography, the category of people defining themselves as “spiritual but not religious” has become one that must be reckoned with since the turn of the century. But, Ryan Burge explains, the data suggest that very few Americans fall into this category:

Using [one] definition, fewer than 20 percent of American adults are spiritual but not religious. It was 8 percent of the country in 1998. That’s a half a point per year increase. It’s certainly some movement, but not at all dramatic. From my vantage point, this is still very much a niche part of the religious landscape.

What’s changed is that religious people are more likely to consider themselves spiritual:

In 1998, just 28 percent of evangelicals described themselves as “very spiritual.” In 2022, that share was up to 46 percent—an 18-point increase. That really struck me, honestly. Maybe all that talk about how “it’s not a religion but a relationship” has led many evangelicals to see themselves as more spiritual. If you look at the graphs for the other Christian traditions you really don’t see anything quite that dramatic.

Read more at Graphs about Religion

More about: American Religion, Evangelical Christianity

What Iran Seeks to Get from Cease-Fire Negotiations

June 20 2025

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.

Read more at Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs

More about: Iran, Israeli Security, U.S. Foreign policy