After decades during which surveys revealed diminishing religiosity in America, the trend seems not only to have stopped, but possibly to have reversed. John Hirschauer considers why that might be so:

Public Christianity in the United States receded in part because a rising counterculture successfully challenged its restrictions on individual conduct. Advocates of cultural liberalization gained support by portraying mid-century Christian institutions as rigid and outdated. But today, that once-rebellious counterculture dominates the spaces that Americans inhabit—schools, workplaces, and popular media. And young people, always drawn to rebellion, appear to be pushing back.

Many are rejecting a culture that exalts personal autonomy and denigrates self-sacrifice. Perhaps as a result, a surprising number of young adults—who might otherwise have left religion at even higher rates than their parents did—are, for the first time in decades, choosing to stay.

This quiet rebellion is driving renewed interest in traditional forms of worship. The youngest cohort of Catholic priests is notably more conservative than previous generations. . . . More broadly, the Pew study found that Christianity is increasingly a marker of conservative political identity across all age groups.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.