The term “virtue signaling” is a very recent one, but I doubt the phenomenon is especially new. Daniel Z. Feldman considers this sort of false piety when analyzing a “baffling” talmudic statement, one that perhaps typifies the rabbis’ use of irony. First, the Talmud claims that after the death of the great sage Judah the Nasi in the early 3rd century CE, “humility [anavah] disappeared from the world.” Naturally, there is an objection, here from Rabbi Joseph, who declares, “Do not say that humility has disappeared, as there is I [ana]!” Feldman writes:

This passage has perplexed many; the idea of anyone proclaiming his own modesty certainly seems contradictory. Some have even suggested that there must have been a third person being referenced with the name “Ana” (or Anna?).

The rabbis taught [in Tractate Avot], “Say little and do much”; my grandfather noted an interpretation that combined the two: say little about the much that you do. The phenomenon of “virtue signaling” is not only immodest; its harm is actually greater than that. First, it has a tendency to crowd out actual accomplishment, and thus reduce virtue in favor of signaling.

And perhaps it’s in our era of self-promotion, humble-bragging, social-media attention seeking, and virtue signaling that Rabbi Joseph’s remark bears the most weight:

To anyone who would say that there is no room for humility in the modern era; that fear of sin, or religious belief, is antiquated, incompatible with the contemporary ethos, it is vitally necessary to protest—there is still a place, a possibility for modesty, restraint, and quiet godliness, and there are still role models to prove it so. We still may not completely understand what anavah is; we definitely know what it is not.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.