The incessant attacks on Jerusalem’s light rail, and last week’s car-ramming attack that killed a three-month-old baby, are not disconnected incidents but the beginning of a third intifada, argues Nadav Shragai:

An intifada is breaking out in Jerusalem. Wednesday, October 22, was its 112th day. It may be a (semi) popular movement but it has long not been spontaneous. The disturbances and continuous attacks on Jews in Jerusalem’s periphery are organized and funded by elements identified with Fatah and Hamas. Many of the 900 arrested in this intifada enjoy legal defense funded by the Palestinian Authority. The huge number of incidents, more than 10,000, their wide distribution over Jerusalem’s periphery, their nature, the use of “cold weaponry,” such as stones, Molotov cocktails, and fireworks—are all reminiscent of the first intifada, which started in 1987.

This time there are no popular resistance committees, but many small organizations that operate on the neighborhood level. They all carry the slogans of a “popular resistance,” preached to them by the Palestinian Authority and its president, Mahmoud Abbas.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.