Should Israel Intervene in the Syrian Civil War?

Bashar al-Assad’s forces have lost control of Syria’s border with Israel, which is now held jointly by the al-Qaeda-linked Nusra Front and non-Islamist Sunni rebels. Israel has been quietly providing assistance to the latter. But with the growing threat of Nusra Front dominance, and the possibility of an Islamic State takeover, a more active approach is called for, contends Ehud Yaari:

So far, most Israeli support for moderate, local, non-Islamist rebel battalions along the border has been limited to humanitarian aid, such as treating 1,400 sick and wounded Syrians in Israeli hospitals, supplying medication, food, and heaters to villagers, and so forth. Some rebel groups maintain constant contact with the IDF, including frequent secret meetings reportedly held in Tiberias. But only a modest amount of weapons has been provided to them, mainly rocket-propelled grenade launchers.

Within the next few months, however, a wider scope of military aid may prove necessary as these non-Islamist battalions—composed mainly of local youths—fight to defend their supremacy in the south against the Nusra Front and Islamic State. An upgraded support program could also help draw many fighters away from Nusra, particularly those who hail from local towns and do not necessarily share al-Qaeda’s ideology.

Read more at Washington Institute

More about: Golan Heights, Nusra Front, Syrian civil war

The Next Diplomatic Steps for Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab States

July 11 2025

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.

Read more at Washington Institute for Near East Policy

More about: Gaza War 2023, Israel diplomacy, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict