Although the most recent acts of terror in Canada came as a surprise to most, they are not unprecedented: a large-scale attack was foiled in 2006, and two more in 2013. Canada is home to at least 80 individuals who returned after joining terrorist organizations abroad. The caliph of Islamic State recently called on Muslims in Canada (and elsewhere) to kill “non-believers,” and an IS video explicitly suggested running people over with cars. As Jonathan D. Halevi writes:

The choice of Canada as a terror target is part of the overall strategy of the Islamic State and the other radical Islamic organizations to weaken the West, dissuade it from a military campaign against radical Islam, and remove all Western presence from the Middle East and Muslim countries. The goal is to expand the caliphate’s borders so as to enable an anti-Western jihad campaign that will bring about global Islamization. The success of the terror attacks in Canada will likely encourage terror groups in the United States, which is Islamic State’s supreme target, to carry out domestic attacks.

Robert Clark explains why the resumption of hostilities is both just and necessary:

These latest Israeli strikes come after weeks of consistent Palestinian provocation; they have repeatedly broken the terms of the cease-fire which they claimed they were so desperate for. There have been numerous [unsuccessful] bus bombings near Tel Aviv and Palestinian-instigated clashes in the West Bank. Fifty-nine Israeli hostages are still held in captivity.

In fact, Hamas and their Palestinian supporters . . . have always known that they can sit back, parade dead Israeli hostages live on social media, and receive hundreds of their own convicted terrorists and murderers back in return. They believed they could get away with the October 7 pogrom.

One hopes Hamas’s leaders will get the message. Meanwhile, many inside and outside Israel seem to believe that, by resuming the fighting, Jerusalem has given up on rescuing the remaining hostages. But, writes Ron Ben-Yishai, this assertion misunderstands the goals of the present campaign. “Experience within the IDF and Israeli intelligence,” Ben-Yishai writes, “has shown that such pressure is the most effective way to push Hamas toward flexibility.” He outlines two other aims:

The second objective was to signal to Hamas that Israel is not only targeting its military wing—the terror army that was the focus of previous phases of the war up until the last cease-fire—but also its governance structure. This was demonstrated by the targeted elimination of five senior officials from Hamas’s political and civilian administration. . . . The strikes also served as a message to mediators, particularly Egypt, that Israel opposes Hamas remaining in any governing or military capacity in post-war Gaza.

The third objective was to create intense military pressure, coordinated with the U.S., on all remaining elements of the Shiite “axis of resistance,” including Yemen’s Houthis, Hamas, and Iran.