At his recent speech at the UN, the Palestinian president retold his usual historical lies, but he also went a step further. It should now be clear to anyone who still had doubts that he is not and will not be a reliable partner for negotiations. And that’s not even the worst of it. Michael Oren writes:

In his previous General Assembly speeches, Mahmoud Abbas denied the Jewish people’s historical connection to the Land of Israel and Jerusalem. But this time he conveyed an unprecedented message: he does not want negotiations–not even American-brokered talks–and is not interested in a durable peace based on security arrangements and mutual recognition. The fact that Israel doesn’t have a partner for peace was accepted by the Israeli public a long time ago. But now we are forced to acknowledge a new fact: that Abbas poses a danger that may be revealed as strategically more serious than the tactical dangers posed by Hamas.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.