Recent declarations by the Swedish government, the British parliament, and the Irish senate recognizing a fictive Palestinian state complement an ongoing campaign by Mahmoud Abbas to obtain recognition of a Palestinian state from international bodies, writes John Bolton. This move is simply the resurrection of a similar campaign launched by Arafat in 1989. That plan achieved negligible success, thanks to U.S. efforts to foil it:

Twenty-five years ago, President George H. W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker conveyed their determination to squelch fanciful maneuverings in the international system, rather than addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict through direct negotiations between the parties themselves. United States resolve prevailed.

Under President Obama, by contrast, we saw American weakness. . . . Sensing that weakness, the Palestinians and their supporters struck, something they had feared to do for over 20 years. Accordingly, today’s Palestinian gambit will turn not on what happens in Stockholm, London, or UN headquarters in Turtle Bay. It will turn on how officials in Washington decide to react.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.