In 2010, computer security experts started detecting the Stuxnet virus spreading rapidly across the Internet. Mysteriously, its complex code seemed to do nothing but further distribute the virus—until it encountered software used by the Iranian nuclear-weapons program, where it proceeded to interfere with the operation of centrifuges. Kim Zetter’s book reconstructing the story of Stuxnet, and examining its implications, is reviewed by Gabriel Schoenfeld:
Zetter marshals evidence suggesting that these high jinks slowed down Iran’s nuclear effort. It is not a criticism of her book to note that this assessment, like many of its observations and conclusions, is at best well-informed conjecture. [The covert operation that created Stuxnet] remains shrouded in secrecy. The interviews and public sources upon which Zetter draws yield no definitive information. Perhaps only the Iranians themselves know for certain what happened, and they are not telling.
Whatever Stuxnet did or did not accomplish, [Zetter’s book] has the virtue of putting the attack into a broader context. The epoch of cyber warfare inaugurated by Stuxnet promises to be no less unnerving than the nuclear-weapons age that began in 1945. The problem is familiar: What goes around comes around. We may hope that the virus damaged the ayatollahs’ nuclear program, but given the degree to which Internet connectivity has expanded into every corner of American life, we ourselves are susceptible to attack by the same kind of stealth weapon.
Read more on Hudson Institute: http://www.hudson.org/research/10798-hacking-the-ayatollahs