Is a Lebanese Jewish Revival Possible?

Lebanon once had a sizable and flourishing Jewish community. Unlike other Arab states, it did not immediately expel its Jewish population after 1948. But growing hostility toward Jews and Israel and sectarian conflict among Sunni, Shiites, and Christians led to a worsening situation. A community that in the 1950s counted over 12,000 members now has fewer than 200 families. Nonetheless, Lebanese Jews abroad, with the help of some wealthy Lebanese non-Jews, have restored Maghen Abraham, Beirut’s last remaining synagogue, which has been unused and in disrepair for the past 30 years. Its reopening is likely to be a mostly symbolic gesture.

It’s unrealistic to expect the opening of the synagogue to inspire a revival of the Jewish community to its former strength: “If at some point Israel and Lebanon establish relations, it is possible. But not until then,” [said one descendent of Lebanese Jewish émigrés]. Although there are four other synagogues scattered across Lebanon—in Bhamdoun, Deir al Qamar, Sidon, and Tripoli—all are derelict or have been closed for decades. There is little prospect that any will open anytime soon. Moreover, those in Lebanon’s existing Jewish community have become accustomed to keeping a low profile, often concealing their names and religion in order to avoid ostracism or hostility.

Read more at Foreign Affairs

More about: Lebanon, Mizrahi Jewry

The Next Diplomatic Steps for Israel, the Palestinians, and the Arab States

July 11 2025

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.

Read more at Washington Institute for Near East Policy

More about: Gaza War 2023, Israel diplomacy, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict