The upsurge of terrorism and unrest in Israel is not solely a product of the fallout of the Gaza war or the failures of the peace process. Rather, argues Jonathan D. Halevi, it is also tied to the successes of Islamic State (IS):

In the new Middle East, increasingly Islamic in character, the winds of jihad are sweeping the masses, and would appear to be the main driving force behind the recent wave of Palestinian violence, not born of political or economic despair but rather hopeful of cracking Israeli confidence and realizing the dream of the liberation of Palestine from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan River, with Jerusalem as capital city of the caliphate. These are also the principles expressed by leaders of the Islamic Movement within the state of Israel who identify with the Muslim Brotherhood.

The more the Islamic caliphate [established by IS] continues to boost its rule in Iraq and Syria and looks certain to destabilize Jordan, the greater are the chances of the collapse of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the expansion of Palestinian violence toward Israel in its various names—popular intifada, armed intifada, or terrorist assault.

Since the war began, there has been a tension between Israel’s two primary goals: the destruction of Hamas and the liberation of the hostages. Many see in Israel’s renewed campaign in Gaza a sacrifice of the latter goal in pursuit of the former. But Meir Ben-Shabbat suggests that Israel’s attacks aim to bring Hamas back to the negotiating table:

The timing of the attack, its intensity, and the extent of casualties surprised Hamas. Its senior leaders are likely still wondering whether this is a limited action meant to shock and send a message or the beginning of a sustained operation. The statement by its senior officials linking the renewal of fighting to the fate of the hostages hints at the way it may act to stop Israel. This threat requires the Israeli political leadership to formulate a series of draconian measures and declare that they will be carried out if Hamas harms the hostages.

Ostensibly, Israel’s interest in receiving the hostages and continuing the fighting stands in complete contradiction to that of Hamas, but in practice Hamas has flexibility that has not yet been exhausted. This stems from the large number of hostages in its possession, which allows it to realize additional deals for some of them, and this is what Israel has been aiming its efforts toward.

We must concede that the challenge Israel faces is not simple, but the alternative Hamas presents—surrendering to its dictates and leaving it as the central power factor in Gaza—limits its options. . . . Tightening and significantly hardening the blockade along with increasing pressure through airstrikes, evacuating areas and capturing them, may force Hamas to make its stance more flexible.

But Ben-Shabbat also acknowledges the danger in this approach. The war’s renewal puts the hostages in greater danger. And as Israel makes threats, it will be obliged to carry them out.