In a recent book, David Wolpe argues that David’s was the first fully explored and fleshed-out personality in human literature. Rather than follow the scholarly practice of trying to unravel and compare the different threads of the biblical narrative, Wolpe explores the psychology and meaning of this complex and compelling character. Indeed, writes Robin Russin, much of the power of the David narrative comes from its hero’s failings:

[O]ne of the arguments for the historical reality of David’s story is that he is portrayed as such a flawed, if charismatic, person. David soothes Saul’s troubled soul with his music at the same time that he has been chosen by Samuel to usurp Saul’s throne—because, essentially, David will be ruthless enough to utterly exterminate his opponents, where Saul was not. Indeed, as Wolpe notes (though disputes), many see “the stench of conspiracy” in David’s convenient absence from the battlefield where Saul and his son Jonathan are killed. The same David who earns—or simply inspires—the love and loyalty of his men steals the wife of one of his most faithful warriors and then, in order to cover his own guilt, sends the man off to die in the forefront of battle. The same David who is anointed to be the next king of all Israel later joins forces with Israel’s bitterest enemy when the need suits him. As Wolpe writes, “An unmixed motive does not seem to exist in David’s world, or in his heart.” The lesson seems to be that none of us is perfect—as God reminds David through the vehicle of the prophet Nathan, who “punctures in parable . . . not only David’s dormant conscience but his self-deceptions and rationalizations.” Even this most blessed of heroes, the chosen of God, is human, and afflicted—perhaps even more so—by the same moral faults and failures as the rest of us.

Why, ask many Israelis, can’t we just end the war, let our children, siblings, and spouses finally come home, and get out the hostages? Azar Gat seeks to answer this question by looking at the possible costs of concluding hostilities precipitously, and breaking down some of the more specific arguments put forward by those who have despaired of continuing military operations in Gaza. He points to the case of the second intifada, in which the IDF not only ended the epidemic of suicide bombing, but effectively convinced—through application of military force—Fatah and other Palestinian factions to cease their terror war.

“What we haven’t achieved militarily in Gaza after a year-and-a-half probably can’t be achieved.” Two years passed from the outbreak of the second intifada until the launch of Operation Defensive Shield, [whose aim was] to reoccupy the West Bank, and another two years until the intifada was fully suppressed. And all of that, then as now, was conducted against the background of a mostly hostile international community and with significant American constraints (together with critical assistance) on Israeli action. The Israeli chief of staff recently estimated that the intensified Israeli military operation in the Gaza Strip would take about two months. Let’s hope that is the case.

The results of the [current] operation in [Gaza] and the breaking of Hamas’s grip on the supply routes may indeed pave the way for the entry of a non-Hamas Palestinian administration into the Strip—an arrangement that would necessarily need to be backed by Israeli bayonets, as in the West Bank. Any other end to the war will lead to Hamas’s recovery and its return to control of Gaza.

It is unclear how much Hamas was or would be willing to compromise on these figures in negotiations. But since the hostages are its primary bargaining chip, it has no incentive to compromise. On the contrary—it is interested in dragging out negotiations indefinitely, insisting on the full evacuation of the Gaza Strip and an internationally guaranteed cease-fire, to ensure its survival as Gaza’s de-facto ruler—a position that would also guarantee access to the flood of international aid destined for the Gaza Strip.

Once the hostages become the exclusive focus of discussion, Hamas dictates the rules. And since not only 251 or twenty hostages, but any number is considered worth “any price,” there is a real concern that Hamas will retain a certain number of captives as a long-term reserve.