Although Mahmoud Abbas condemned yesterday’s terrorist attack on worshippers in a Jerusalem synagogue, in the next breath he condemned “invasions of al-Aqsa mosque, the provocations of settlers, and the incitement of certain Israeli ministers.” Over the last weeks, he and his Fatah associates have praised perpetrators of terrorist attacks and published cartoons glorifying violence. Nor are they content to support terror merely with words, as Shoham Wexler writes:

The Palestinian Authority . . . is also active in protecting murderers and terrorists. Thus, for instance, the PA pays a salary to Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails. A prisoner serving a sentence of up to three years gets a monthly salary of 1,400 Israeli shekels. If he’s serving a period of 10-15 years, he receives a monthly “salary” of 6,000 shekels. The hardcore prisoners serving for 30 years and above get 12,000 shekels. In addition to the “salaries,” the PA prison-affairs ministry and the PLO prison-affairs authority provide grants of 2,000 shekels a month to released prisoners who can’t find work. Some of the prisoners also receive money from Hamas and organizations like the al-Nur prisoners’ association. So a terrorist can receive a monthly salary of thousands of shekels just for attacking Jews.

Before we Israelis throw up our hands and argue that there’s no way to fight a “grassroots war,” we need to remember that this was preceded by a massive incitement campaign and financial aid and security for anyone (or their families) who attacks Jews. This is a psychological and financial lifeline we can and should cut, and the sooner the better.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.