Both the Likud and its various opponents have decided to make the upcoming election all about the current prime minister, with one left-wing politician adopting “just not Bibi” as her unofficial slogan. But there is still much popular support for the prime minister and, despite conventional wisdom in the U.S., this has little to do with dislike of the American president, as Haviv Rettig Gur explains:

Foreign observers routinely misunderstand Netanyahu’s popularity in the Israeli electorate. In 2009, when U.S. President Barack Obama pressured Netanyahu on settlement construction, eventually extracting from him a ten-month settlement freeze, Obama’s formerly sky-high popularity among Israelis plummeted. In the years since, many American officials, Obama included, interpreted this decline as a sign of Netanyahu’s popularity: when the two leaders bickered, Israelis rallied around their own.

But Netanyahu’s approval ratings didn’t soar when Obama’s crashed. Israelis wrote off America’s leader on the basis of his own failings, as they saw them. His tiffs with Netanyahu were secondary to the perception among many Israelis that Obama seemed to be shortsightedly expecting them, after the second intifada, the second Lebanon war, and a fresh war in Gaza, to trust once again in their neighbors’ peaceful intentions. . . .

[A] poll over the weekend found that just 36 percent of Israelis view Netanyahu as the most fit candidate for the job of prime minister among those running. Yet these numbers mark little change from the past. Netanyahu has won elections not because of his own popularity, but because of his opponents’ unpopularity.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.