Iran Is Stepping up Its Arming of Hamas and Hizballah, in Preparation for War with Israel

Dec. 24 2014

Iran’s relationship with Hamas broke down when the two backed opposite sides in the Syrian civil war. But now Iran is supporting Hamas’s aspiration to take over the West Bank, thus potentially enabling massive simultaneous missile attacks on Israel. To make matters worse, Russia is supporting this project with arms sales. Michael Segall explains:

Iran, as statements by its senior officials suggest, is working to encircle Israel from the north (Hizballah), the south (Gaza), and the east (the West Bank) and to turn the rocket threat into an unbroken ring around Israeli territory. This Iranian activity is incessant, and it includes persistent smuggling of weapons into Gaza as well as shipments and convoys to Hizballah via Syria. According to foreign reports, sometimes Israel thwarts these weapons shipments in Syrian territory. . . . These reports note that some of the weapons destroyed in an attack on December 7 included advanced Russian-made antiaircraft systems . . . Fateh-110 missiles . . . and Iranian [drones]. . . . .

A few hours before the most recent alleged Israeli attack, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s special envoy to the Middle East, Mikhail Bogdanov, met with Hizballah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah as part of the activities marking the 70th anniversary of Russian-Lebanese diplomatic relations. Iran, Russia, and Hizballah have a common interest—the survival of Bashar al-Assad.

Read more at Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

More about: Hamas, Hizballah, Iran, Israeli Security, Vladimir Putin, West Bank

The U.S. Has Finally Turned Up the Heat on the Houthis—but Will It Be Enough?

March 17 2025

Last Tuesday, the Houthis—the faction now ruling much of Yemen—said that they intend to renew attacks on international shipping through the Red and Arabian Seas. They had for the most part paused their attacks following the January 19 Israel-Hamas cease-fire, but their presence has continued to scare away maritime traffic near the Yemeni coast, with terrible consequences for the global economy.

The U.S. responded on Saturday by initiating strikes on Houthi missile depots, command-and-control centers, and propaganda outlets, and has promised that the attacks will continue for days, if not weeks. The Houthis responded by launching drones, and possibly missiles, at American naval ships, apparently without result. Another missile fired from Yemen struck the Sinai, but was likely aimed at Israel. As Ari Heistein has written in Mosaic, it may take a sustained and concerted effort to stop the Houthis, who have high tolerance for casualties—but this is a start. Ron Ben-Yishai provides some context:

The goal is to punish the Houthis for directly targeting Western naval vessels in the Red Sea while also exerting indirect pressure on Tehran over its nuclear program. . . . While the Biden administration did conduct airstrikes against the Houthis, it refrained from a proactive military campaign, fearing a wider regional war. However, following the collapse of Iran’s axis—including Hizballah’s heavy losses in Lebanon and the fall of the Assad regime in Syria—the Trump administration appears unafraid of such an escalation.

Iran, the thinking goes, will also get the message that the U.S. isn’t afraid to use force, or risk the consequences of retaliation—and will keep this in mind as it considers negotiations over its nuclear program. Tamir Hayman adds:

The Houthis are the last proxy of the Shiite axis that have neither reassessed their actions nor restrained their weapons. Throughout the campaign against the Yemenite terrorist organization, the U.S.-led coalition has made operational mistakes: Houthi regime infrastructure was not targeted; the organization’s leaders were not eliminated; no sustained operational continuity was maintained—only actions to remove immediate threats; no ground operations took place, not even special-forces missions; and Iran has not paid a price for its proxy’s actions.

But if this does not stop the Houthis, it will project weakness—not just toward Hamas but primarily toward Iran—and Trump’s power diplomacy will be seen as hollow. The true test is one of output, not input. The only question that matters is not how many strikes the U.S. carries out, but whether the Red Sea reopens to all vessels. We will wait and see—for now, things look brighter than they did before.

Read more at Institute for National Security Studies

More about: Donald Trump, Houthis, Iran, U.S. Foreign policy, Yemen