The percentage of Arab students at the Technion, Israel’s prestigious science and engineering university, has tripled over the past quarter-century, bringing it into line with the proportion of Arabs in the general population. Many of these students are women, and they are not only matriculating, but graduating. Peter Coy explains how this came to be:

How did Arabs manage to gain such a solid foothold at the Technion? One factor . . . is a network of excellent private schools for Arabs. Many are run by Arab Christians but are open to Muslims as well. The Israeli government has provided funding to those schools based on attendance, similar to voucher systems in the U.S. Education is seen as a pathway out of poverty by many Arab Christians.

Jewish philanthropists including Benny and Patsy Landa helped kick the Technion’s efforts into a higher gear about a decade ago. . . . Other philanthropists have since made donations. The Higher Education Council of Israel added support as well, mostly over the past five years.

Small in area and population and rich in natural gas, Qatar plays an outsize role in the Middle East. While its support keeps Hamas in business, it also has vital relations with Israel that are much better than those enjoyed by many other Arab countries. Doha’s relationship with Washington, though more complex, isn’t so different. Yoel Guzansky offers a comprehensive examination of Israel’s Qatar dilemma:

At first glance, Qatar’s foreign policy seems filled with contradictions. Since 1995, it has pursued a strategy of diplomatic hedging—building relationships with multiple, often competing, actors. Qatar’s vast wealth and close ties with the United States have enabled it to maneuver independently on the international stage, maintaining relations with rival factions, including those that are direct adversaries.

Qatar plays an active role in international diplomacy, engaging in conflict mediation in over twenty regions worldwide. While not all of its mediation efforts have been successful, they have helped boost its international prestige, which it considers vital for its survival among larger and more powerful neighbors. Qatar has participated in mediation efforts in Venezuela, Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and other conflict zones, reinforcing its image as a neutral broker.

Israel’s stated objective of removing Hamas from power in Gaza is fundamentally at odds with Qatar’s interest in keeping Hamas as the governing force. In theory, if the Israeli hostages would to be released, Israel could break free from its dependence on Qatari mediation. However, it is likely that even after such a development, Qatar will continue positioning itself as a mediator—particularly in enforcing agreements and shaping Gaza’s reconstruction efforts.

Qatar’s position is strengthened further by its good relations with the U.S. Yet, Guzansky notes, it has weaknesses as well that Israel could exploit:

Qatar is highly sensitive to its global image and prides itself on maintaining a neutral diplomatic posture. If Israel chooses to undermine Qatar’s reputation, it could target specific aspects of Qatari activity that are problematic from an Israeli perspective.