In part, the fall of the current Israeli government can be blamed on the clumsy maneuvering of some of its members. But the underlying cause, argues Haviv Rettig Gur, lies in deep changes in Israel’s political system. When two major parties dominated the Knesset, there was a clear-cut divide between left and right, and each side had its own answer to the Palestinian question, which was the major issue of the day. After the second intifada and the collapse of the Oslo peace process, the system fell apart, leading to a proliferation of small parties, growing cynicism among voters, the rise of a new political class, and a sense of confusion on key issues—all of which contributed to the current crisis. Gur writes:

[The Palestinian] question has now been settled, not because peace has been achieved but because the vast majority of the Israeli public is convinced peace is not possible in the foreseeable future. The second intifada that launched in late 2000 undermined the essential narratives of left and right. Most Israelis never again believed left-wing leaders who argued the Palestinians seek peace, or right-wing leaders who said the Palestinians could be occupied indefinitely. And with the fall of their unifying narratives, the broad-based parties who once represented the widely-held sensibilities on either side collapsed as well. . . . The electorate is more fickle, and more cynical. . . . And those who continue to vote swerve easily from left to right, apparently based more on the personalities of party leaders than on any ideological commitments.

Into this electoral chaos, this crisis of political identity and purpose, a new breed of Israeli politician has arisen. The old defense-establishment elite that once ran the country, from generals like Yitzhak Rabin and Ariel Sharon to former defense-ministry director Shimon Peres, gave way to a new class of PR-savvy, socially minded journalists, businesspeople, and high-minded academics. . . . As politicians sense the fickleness of voters, and are acutely aware that they are competing for a shrunken electorate with a growing list of parties, the difference between governing and electioneering has collapsed.

Israel will likely respond directly against Iran after yesterday’s attack, and has made known that it will calibrate its retaliation based not on the extent of the damage, but on the scale of the attack. The specifics are anyone’s guess, but Edward Luttwak has a suggestion, put forth in an article published just hours before the missile barrage: cut off Tehran’s ability to send money and arms to Shiite Arab militias.

In practice, most of this cash comes from a single source: oil. . . . In other words, the flow of dollars that sustains Israel’s enemies, and which has caused so much trouble to Western interests from the Syrian desert to the Red Sea, emanates almost entirely from the oil loaded onto tankers at the export terminal on Khark Island, a speck of land about 25 kilometers off Iran’s southern coast. Benjamin Netanyahu warned in his recent speech to the UN General Assembly that Israel’s “long arm” can reach them too. Indeed, Khark’s location in the Persian Gulf is relatively close. At 1,516 kilometers from Israel’s main airbase, it’s far closer than the Houthis’ main oil import terminal at Hodeida in Yemen—a place that was destroyed by Israeli jets in July, and attacked again [on Sunday].