What Did Ancient Jewish Priests Look Like?

Dec. 16 2014

Although the Bible contains extensive descriptions of the ritual garments worn by Temple priests, artistic renderings are virtually nonexistent. But the Septuagint, a Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible, uses words that suggest how the clothing might have looked. The Greek text also informed Roman artists, helping them create a stereotypical “look” that signified Jewishness. Joan E. Taylor writes (free registration required):

The Septuagint’s Greek words link priestly dress with Persian attire. Persians . . . were known to wear pants and waist-tied tunics, with capes clasped with a brooch, along with floppy “Phrygian” caps, as can be seen in the Arch of Septimius Severus in Rome. So what the Septuagint indicates is that priestly dress was quite Persian/Parthian-looking. Importantly, [1st-century Jewish historian] Josephus—himself a priest—described in detail what he knew priests to wear in his own day. . . .

If in Greek texts Jewish priestly attire is presented as being rather Persian or Parthian in appearance, this might also explain a puzzling image on Roman coins commemorating victory over the Judean revolt. The coin type has Titus on the obverse and a Judean kneeling under a Roman trophy on the reverse.

It is usually assumed that the Romans simply depicted the Judean here as a Parthian, as a kind of one-size-fits-all “conquered rebel” type. Clearly, the figure looks like a subjugated (enslaved) Parthian as found in the statues of the public Gardens of Sallust. However, . . . viewers are supposed to “get” that this man on the coin is a Judean, [even though] there is no date palm (symbol of Judea) to identify him, or the words IUDAEA CAPTA (for the literate), as we find on other coinage.

Read more at ASOR

More about: Ancient Israel, Ancient Rome, Priesthood, Second Temple, Septuagint, Temple

Can a Weakened Iran Survive?

Dec. 13 2024

Between the explosion of thousands of Hizballah pagers on September 17 and now, Iran’s geopolitical clout has shrunk dramatically: Hizballah, Iran’s most important striking force, has retreated to lick its wounds; Iranian influence in Syria has collapsed; Iran’s attempts to attack Israel via Gaza have proved self-defeating; its missile and drone arsenal have proved impotent; and its territorial defenses have proved useless in the face of Israeli airpower. Edward Luttwak considers what might happen next:

The myth of Iranian power was ironically propagated by the United States itself. Right at the start of his first term, in January 2009, Barack Obama was terrified that he would be maneuvered into fighting a war against Iran. . . . Obama started his tenure by apologizing for America’s erstwhile support for the shah. And beyond showing contrition for the past, the then-president also set a new rule, one that lasted all the way to October 2024: Iran may attack anyone, but none may attack Iran.

[Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s] variegated fighters, in light trucks and jeeps, could have been stopped by a few hundred well-trained soldiers. But neither Hizballah nor Iran’s own Revolutionary Guards could react. Hizballah no longer has any large units capable of crossing the border to fight rebels in Syria, as they had done so many times before. As for the Revolutionary Guards, they were commandeering civilian airliners to fly troops into Damascus airport to support Assad. But then Israel made clear that it would not allow Iran’s troops so close to its border, and Iran no longer had credible counter-threats.

Now Iran’s population is discovering that it has spent decades in poverty to pay for the massive build-up of the Revolutionary Guards and all their militias. And for what? They have elaborate bases and showy headquarters, but their expensive ballistic missiles can only be used against defenseless Arabs, not Israel with its Arrow interceptors. As for Hizballah, clearly it cannot even defend itself, let alone Iran’s remaining allies in the region. Perhaps, in short, the dictatorship will finally be challenged in the streets of Iran’s cities, at scale and in earnest.

Read more at UnHerd

More about: Gaza War 2023, Iran, Israeli strategy, Middle East