In Operation Protective Edge, Israel was able to achieve its goal of stopping rocket fire without a full-scale invasion of the Gaza strip, and without significant concessions to Hamas. Yet Hamas remains in power in Gaza and is no doubt planning its next war. In his summation of lessons learned from the conflict, Amos Yadlin, a former chief of military intelligence, considers who won, weighs the benefits and drawbacks of leaving Hamas in power, and ponders the IDF’s strategy for the next round:

The way in which the campaign was conducted countered Israel’s traditional security concept, which is based on deterrence, early warning, and decision. Israel’s overwhelming military power and the results of the previous conflicts did not deter Hams from initiating the recent offensive. There was no specific intelligence indication or strategic warning about the approaching conflict. . . . Likewise, in the conflict itself, Israel did not achieve a decisive victory. Clearly, it is not possible to apply the traditional security concept to every campaign or round of conflict, but it is important that it serve as a fundamental frame of reference for the Israeli defense leadership. . . .

Hamas in Gaza is neither a classic terrorist organization nor is it a normal state. If falls under a new definition of a hybrid organization that includes elements of the two configurations. Therefore, when fighting against it, it is necessary to apply all elements of the classic security doctrine as well as mission-specific elements of a war against non-state terrorist organizations.

Robert Clark explains why the resumption of hostilities is both just and necessary:

These latest Israeli strikes come after weeks of consistent Palestinian provocation; they have repeatedly broken the terms of the cease-fire which they claimed they were so desperate for. There have been numerous [unsuccessful] bus bombings near Tel Aviv and Palestinian-instigated clashes in the West Bank. Fifty-nine Israeli hostages are still held in captivity.

In fact, Hamas and their Palestinian supporters . . . have always known that they can sit back, parade dead Israeli hostages live on social media, and receive hundreds of their own convicted terrorists and murderers back in return. They believed they could get away with the October 7 pogrom.

One hopes Hamas’s leaders will get the message. Meanwhile, many inside and outside Israel seem to believe that, by resuming the fighting, Jerusalem has given up on rescuing the remaining hostages. But, writes Ron Ben-Yishai, this assertion misunderstands the goals of the present campaign. “Experience within the IDF and Israeli intelligence,” Ben-Yishai writes, “has shown that such pressure is the most effective way to push Hamas toward flexibility.” He outlines two other aims:

The second objective was to signal to Hamas that Israel is not only targeting its military wing—the terror army that was the focus of previous phases of the war up until the last cease-fire—but also its governance structure. This was demonstrated by the targeted elimination of five senior officials from Hamas’s political and civilian administration. . . . The strikes also served as a message to mediators, particularly Egypt, that Israel opposes Hamas remaining in any governing or military capacity in post-war Gaza.

The third objective was to create intense military pressure, coordinated with the U.S., on all remaining elements of the Shiite “axis of resistance,” including Yemen’s Houthis, Hamas, and Iran.