It is no secret that President Obama wishes Israel had a prime minister other than Benjamin Netanyahu. For the first time in many years, the Israeli left seems to be presenting a credible electoral threat to the Likud. However, writes, Steven J. Rosen, there are many reasons Israeli voters may still turn toward Netanyahu, and an effort to undermine him by provoking a conflict could backfire. Rosen writes:

[T]he left has its own vulnerability, especially on the issue of the Palestinians. Most Israelis do not think the rise of Hamas, Hizballah, and Islamic State makes this a great time to sign an agreement requiring the IDF to leave the West Bank. They followed Ariel Sharon when he pulled every soldier and every settler out of Gaza in 2005, but what happened after that withdrawal was the opposite of “land for peace.” Disengagement in 2005 brought, not peace, but the election of Hamas in 2006; a coup in Gaza in 2007; three wars in Gaza in 2008-9, 2012, and 2013; 10,000 rockets and missiles where before there were none; tunnels to infiltrate Israeli communities; and lots more. . . .

But where, some argue, Netanyahu may be more vulnerable, is by feeding the belief that he has strained relations with Israel’s traditional allies in the United States and Europe. . . . If Obama decides to pick a fight with Netanyahu to influence the Israeli election, it could be focused on their personal relations. . . . [However,] Obama could pay a price for provoking another confrontation with Bibi. His own credibility is tarnished, particularly in foreign policy. He faces a Republican Congress that is unlikely to go along. The theory that friction will weaken Netanyahu is unproved; the reverse could happen. And Netanyahu may well win the Israeli election on March 17, so Obama needs to think about the morning after.

Robert Clark explains why the resumption of hostilities is both just and necessary:

These latest Israeli strikes come after weeks of consistent Palestinian provocation; they have repeatedly broken the terms of the cease-fire which they claimed they were so desperate for. There have been numerous [unsuccessful] bus bombings near Tel Aviv and Palestinian-instigated clashes in the West Bank. Fifty-nine Israeli hostages are still held in captivity.

In fact, Hamas and their Palestinian supporters . . . have always known that they can sit back, parade dead Israeli hostages live on social media, and receive hundreds of their own convicted terrorists and murderers back in return. They believed they could get away with the October 7 pogrom.

One hopes Hamas’s leaders will get the message. Meanwhile, many inside and outside Israel seem to believe that, by resuming the fighting, Jerusalem has given up on rescuing the remaining hostages. But, writes Ron Ben-Yishai, this assertion misunderstands the goals of the present campaign. “Experience within the IDF and Israeli intelligence,” Ben-Yishai writes, “has shown that such pressure is the most effective way to push Hamas toward flexibility.” He outlines two other aims:

The second objective was to signal to Hamas that Israel is not only targeting its military wing—the terror army that was the focus of previous phases of the war up until the last cease-fire—but also its governance structure. This was demonstrated by the targeted elimination of five senior officials from Hamas’s political and civilian administration. . . . The strikes also served as a message to mediators, particularly Egypt, that Israel opposes Hamas remaining in any governing or military capacity in post-war Gaza.

The third objective was to create intense military pressure, coordinated with the U.S., on all remaining elements of the Shiite “axis of resistance,” including Yemen’s Houthis, Hamas, and Iran.