Immigration to Israel in 2014 was at its highest in a decade. No doubt, this had something to do with the wave of anti-Semitism sweeping Europe. But Jews do not come to Israel solely to escape persecution; like Rom Lerner, who emigrated from Kenya with the assistance of Garin Tzabar, an Israel Scouts project, many come because they want to live in and serve their national homeland. He writes of his own experience:

Most of us have not personally experienced unusual anti-Semitic events, most of our parents haven’t been seriously affected by the economic situation, and to be honest, most of us had a comfortable, well-planned life ahead of us. The truth is that the real reason is very simple and contains two parts. . . . None of the young people of Garin Tzabar, myself included, have given up—despite the many temptations—on our right to take on the burden of protecting our Jewish identity. We were never willing to cut the historic, cultural, or religious ties that bind us [to the Jewish people], even if some of us had only seen Israel on postcards. We always fought—in school, at conferences, in forums, in conversations with friends—to tell Israel’s side, despite the criticism we got for it.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.