Despite American claims that Syria gave up its chemical-weapons program in 2013, there is now overwhelming evidence that Bashar al-Assad still has such weapons and is using them regularly. Dany Shoham explains, noting implications for the Iran deal:
Increasingly worried about his military position, Assad could expand the employment of chemical weapons (chiefly chlorine, during the last year) in order aggressively to defend his core territory. VX [gas], in addition to sarin, could also be very useful for that purpose. . . . If this option becomes necessary for his survival, and is the only option open to him, he will expectedly exercise it—international opinion be damned. . . .
[T]he Syrian regime has repeatedly exploited . . . the civil war and the confrontations with Islamic State (IS) and the rebels as an excuse for impeding inspections activities. Regime representatives have been able to prevent the inspectors from reaching a specific location by simply stating that it is too dangerous. If an inspection team ignores this advice, there are a number of options to ensure it does not reach its destination, the ultimate one being a physical attack, deniable under the “fog” of the civil war. . . .
The employment of weaponized chlorine by Syrian helicopters is almost routine, and, although forbidden, is tolerated by the international community. It has proved to be effective, usually dropped [on targets] in barrels. . . . IS [also] has deployed chlorine gas-based chemical weapons against Iraqi government forces, Syrian government forces, and Syrian opposition forces, and has used unidentified chemical weapons against Kurds in Kobane.
Taking a broader perspective, there are lessons to be drawn from this Syrian weapons-monitoring experience and the current debate over the P5+1 accord with Iran. . . . Effective implementation of the Iran nuclear deal is subject to good intelligence and effective monitoring. The reluctance of the international community to act forcibly regarding the inspections regime in Syria, in particular with respect to investigating its undeclared chemical-weapons capabilities, is a very bad sign.
Read more on BESA Center: http://besacenter.org/perspectives-papers/syrias-chemical-weapon-obfuscations/