Hamas has been funneling cash—much of which originates in Iran—to Islamic State’s Sinai branch, in exchange for materials it needs for its rockets. And the cooperation doesn’t end there, as Alex Fishman writes:

Egyptian security officials note that it is solely thanks to Hamas’s monetary and professional support of IS in the Sinai that the branch has, in the last few years, turned from a gang of Bedouin with light weapons into a well-trained, well-armed group of 800 militants. IS in the Sinai has been doggedly fighting the Egyptian army and threatening to carry out terror attacks against Israelis close to the border.

Israeli officials believe that if the situation escalates on the Gaza front, both IS in the Sinai and IS in Gaza will aid Hamas in its fight against the IDF. . . .

In exchange for smuggling services and cooperation with Hamas, IS in the Sinai receives not only money but also logistical support. For example, when the group recently had difficulties in transferring its wounded militants to Gaza for treatment, Hamas sent medical teams into the Sinai in order to attend to them there. Hamas has also provided IS in the Sinai with training and sophisticated military equipment.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.