For decades, the core of American Jewish support for Israel lay in what was once the communal mainstream: upper-middle class, non-Orthodox Jews. But evidence suggests that this support is rapidly declining even as the numbers of non-Orthodox Jews are also shrinking. Taking into account demographic and opinion surveys, Owen Alterman argues that Israel should recalibrate its outreach to American Jews to appeal to two groups whose numbers are on the rise, and whose support for Israel is greater than often assumed. (Article begins at p. 43.)

While decades of intermarriage and assimilation have eroded the established core of American Jewry, they have also produced millions of Americans who do not self-identify as Jews but who have a familial or other affinity to Judaism. . . . The 2013 Pew study identifies and defines two distinct groups of Americans who themselves are not Jewish but who have a particular link to Judaism. The first is the “Jewish background” group: Americans with a Jewish parent who do not (or no longer) identify as Jews. The second is the “Jewish affinity” group: non-Jews without a Jewish parent who nonetheless see themselves as linked to Judaism in some way. The links to Judaism are varied, ranging from those citing that “Jesus was Jewish” to those citing a Jewish spouse or Jewish grandparents. . . .

Taken together, these “Jewish background” and “Jewish affinity” sectors are enormous, [and] show a reasonably strong connection to Judaism and Jewish institutions, which sets them apart from non-Jewish Americans. . . . The sectors also show a strong emotional connection to Israel. A large proportion . . . believes that the United States is “not supportive enough” of Israel. Significantly, [this proportion] is actually greater than [that of the non-Orthodox] communal core holding this belief.

Similarly, Alterman continues, the ultra-Orthodox are often assumed both to be unsupportive of Israel and to have limited financial resources, but neither assumption is true across the board.

Two of the most important questions about the recent agreement with Hamas are “Why now?” and “What is the relationship between the deal and the military campaign?” To Ron Ben-Yishai, the answer to the two questions is related, and flies in the face of the widespread (and incorrect) claim that the same agreement could have been reached in May:

Contrary to certain public perceptions, the military pressure exerted on northern Gaza in recent months was the main leverage that led to flexibility on the part of Hamas and made clear to the terror group that it would do well to agree to a deal now, before thousands more of its fighters are killed, and before the IDF advances further and destroys Gaza entirely.

Andrew Fox, meanwhile, presents a more comprehensive strategic analysis of the cease-fire:

Tactically, Hamas has taken a severe beating in Gaza since October 2023. It is assessed that it has lost as much as 90 percent of military capability and 80 percent of manpower, although it has recruited well and boosted its numbers from below 10,000 to the 20–30,000 range. However, these are untrained recruits, often under-age, and the IDF has been striking their training camps in northern Gaza so they have been unable to form any kind of meaningful capability. This is not a fighting force that retains any ability to harm the IDF in real numbers, although, as seen this past week with a fatal IED attack, they are able to score the odd hit.

However, this has not affected Hamas’s ability to retain administrative control of Gaza.

Internationally, Hamas sits alone in glory on the information battlefield. It has won the most resounding victory imaginable in the world’s media, in Western states, and on the Internet. . . . The stock of the Palestinian cause rides high internationally and will only get higher as Hamas proclaims a victory following this cease-fire deal. By means of political pressure on Israel, the international information campaign has kept Hamas in the fight, extended the war, prolonged the suffering of Gazan civilians, and has ultimately handed Hamas a win through the fact of their continued survival and eventual rebuild.

Indeed, writes Fox in a separate post, the “images coming out of Gaza over the last few days show us that too many in the wider world have been played for fools.”

Hamas fighters have been seen emerging from hospitals and the humanitarian zone. Well-fed Palestinians, with fresh haircuts and Adidas tracksuits, or in just vests, cheer for the camera. . . . There was no starvation. There was no freezing. There was no genocide.