Last week, in response to attacks on an American naval vessel, the U.S destroyed three coastal radar installations used by Yemen’s Iran-backed Houthi militia. An earlier missile strike by the same militia was directed at ships of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a member of the Saudi-led and U.S.-supported anti-Houthi coalition. Despite the U.S. response, the Houthis have continued to fire at American ships. Michael Segall explains the significance of this conflict:

The firing of guided shore-to-sea missiles at U.S. and UAE ships constitutes an escalation in the Yemeni conflict and could pose a threat to a key international sea lane in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The ability to fire guided missiles, along with their long-range (120 km), endangers not only the [Saudi-led] coalition’s freedom of action and ability to enforce the Arab embargo [on the Houthis], but also civilian vessels, including tankers that operate in the area.

Iran’s aid to the Houthi rebels has apparently increased. . . . Iran is [evidently now] prepared to provide tie-breaking weapons that could help the Houthis breach the naval blockade that Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners have imposed on Yemen. . . . It [also] appears . . . that, since the Houthis have held their own in the battles, the embargo is ineffective and Iran has [already] found other lanes for transferring weapons. . . .

For Iran, Yemen is a perfect venue for [testing its weaponry and tactics]. Iran is preparing for future engagement with the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf where [it] frequently provokes and sometimes humiliates American naval presence in the area. The Americans’ reaction to launching the missiles against its ships may change the dynamics. Playing the incident down will again play into Iranian propaganda and bolster Iran’s already overconfident and defiant stance.

Information about a supposedly near-finalized hostage deal continued to trickle out yesterday. While it’s entirely possible that by the time you read this a deal will be much more certain, it is every bit as likely that it will have fallen through by then. More likely still, we will learn that there are indefinite and unspecified delays. Then there are the details: even in the best of scenarios, not all the hostages will be returned at once, and Israel will have to make painful concessions in exchange, including the release of hundreds of hardened terrorists and the withdrawal from key parts of the Gaza Strip.

Unusually—if entirely appropriately—the president-elect’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, has participated in the talks alongside members of President Biden’s team. Philip Klein examines the incoming Trump administration’s role in the process:

President-elect Trump has repeatedly warned that there would be “all hell to pay” if hostages were not returned from Gaza by the time he takes office. While he has never laid out exactly what the specific consequences for Hamas would be, there are some ominous signs that Israel is being pressured into paying a tremendous price.

There is obviously more here than we know. It’s possible that with the pressure from the Trump team came reassurances that Israel would have more latitude to reenter Gaza as necessary to go after Hamas than it would have enjoyed under Biden. . . . That said, all appearances are that Israel has been forced into making more concessions because Trump was concerned that he’d be embarrassed if January 20 came around with no hostages released.

While Donald Trump’s threats are a welcome rhetorical shift, part of the problem may be their vagueness. After all, it’s unlikely the U.S. would use military force to unleash hell in Gaza, or could accomplish much in doing so that the IDF can’t. More useful would be direct threats against countries like Qatar and Turkey that host Hamas, and threats to the persons and bank accounts of the Hamas officials living in those counties. Witkoff instead praised the Qatari prime minister for “doing God’s work” in the negotiations.”