The Obama administration made numerous unacknowledged concessions to the Islamic Republic to induce it to agree to a nuclear deal that was in itself favorable to Iranian interests. Josh Meyer reports that these included restraining federal officials from prosecuting Iranian agents who were working to obtain illegal nuclear and military technology. What’s more, the White House also released some particularly dangerous individuals when ransoming American hostages:

President Obama . . . and other administration representatives weren’t telling the whole story on January 17, 2016, in their highly choreographed rollout of the prisoner swap and simultaneous implementation of the six-party nuclear deal. . . . In his Sunday morning address to the American people, Obama portrayed the seven men he freed as “civilians.” [One] senior official described them as businessmen convicted of or awaiting trial for mere “sanctions-related offenses, violations of the trade embargo.”

In reality, some of them were accused by Obama’s own Justice Department of posing threats to national security. Three allegedly were part of an illegal procurement network supplying Iran with U.S.-made microelectronics with applications in surface-to-air and cruise missiles like the kind Tehran test-fired recently. . . . And in a series of unpublicized court filings, the Justice Department dropped charges and international arrest warrants against fourteen other men, all of them fugitives. The administration didn’t disclose their names or what they were accused of doing. . . . Three of the fugitives allegedly sought to lease Boeing aircraft to an Iranian airline that authorities say had supported Hizballah.

[Another], Amin Ravan, was charged with smuggling U.S. military antennae to Hong Kong and Singapore for use in Iran. U.S. authorities also believe he was part of a procurement network providing Iran with high-tech components for an especially deadly type of improvised explosive device used by Shiite militias to kill hundreds of American troops in Iraq. The biggest fish, though, was Seyed Abolfazl Shahab Jamili, who had been charged with being part of a conspiracy that from 2005 to 2012 procured thousands of parts with nuclear applications for Iran via China. . . .

The National Counterproliferation Initiative, created with much fanfare a decade ago, has suffered greatly [from the Obama administration’s efforts to thwart its work], many participants said. . . . [K]ey enforcement efforts are in limbo as the result of stalled or stymied investigations and prosecutions, and the trail of some high-value targets has gone cold, numerous participants said. . . . [Furthermore], despite repeated requests, many [federal prosecutors and agents] were not given guidance or reassurances that the nuclear deal being negotiated in secret wouldn’t render unprosecutable new and ongoing cases, especially high-priority ones against nuclear traffickers. . . . So agents had no confidence that their work would bear fruit.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.