Since May, American forces in Syria have attacked a supply convoy of Iranian troops and Iran-backed militias and shot down two Iranian drones and one Syrian fighter jet. In each of these cases, Iran and its allies had first violated the U.S. zone of operations established by agreement with Russia; in two cases, aircraft directly attacked American troops. Tehran also fired ballistic missiles at Islamic State (IS) targets in the Euphrates River Valley, a move, Nader Uskowi writes, “signaling to all [Iran’s] opponents, including the United States and its allies, its intention to compete in the area after the Islamic State falls.” Thus, Uskowi argues, as IS is on the verge of crumbling, Washington must seek to thwart Iran’s plan to consolidate its influence throughout Syria:

Iran-led forces . . . will present arguably the greatest future threat to U.S. military personnel and interests in Syria. In the Iraq-Syria border region, Iran is executing a strategy centered on establishing a land bridge to Syria through Iraqi territory. Such a plan will inevitably cause direct conflict with U.S.-backed Sunni opposition forces. . . . [Their] big battles will thus be fought against the Shiite militias, led by Iranian special forces. . . .

The new battlespace in formerly IS-held territories . . . calls for a new U.S. policy, the chief component of which should be a strategy targeting Iran’s Qods Force and its Shiite militias. . . . Iranian strategy unmistakably focuses on defeating U.S.-supported opposition forces and pushing the United States out of Syria. Absent a new strategy that addresses Iran’s involvement in Syria, U.S. and allied forces could [do little more than] resort to self-defense tactics when under attack. In the process, such relative passivity could embolden Iran to raise the temperature in hopes of booting U.S. forces from the country. . . .

Iran-led forces are, with strong backing from Russia, already in control of Alawite-led western Syria. Their expansion into the Sunni-majority east and south could prolong the civil war and risk widening it further, . . . pitting major powers against each other. . . . Any attempt by Iran to extend the Sunni-Shiite conflict into those regions should be stopped in its tracks.

Analyzing the recent direct Iranian attack on Israel, and Israel’s security situation more generally, Michael Oren looks to the 2015 agreement to restrain Iran’s nuclear program. That, and President Biden’s efforts to resurrect the deal after Donald Trump left it, are in his view the source of the current crisis:

Of the original motivations for the deal—blocking Iran’s path to the bomb and transforming Iran into a peaceful nation—neither remained. All Biden was left with was the ability to kick the can down the road and to uphold Barack Obama’s singular foreign-policy achievement.

In order to achieve that result, the administration has repeatedly refused to punish Iran for its malign actions:

Historians will survey this inexplicable record and wonder how the United States not only allowed Iran repeatedly to assault its citizens, soldiers, and allies but consistently rewarded it for doing so. They may well conclude that in a desperate effort to avoid getting dragged into a regional Middle Eastern war, the U.S. might well have precipitated one.

While America’s friends in the Middle East, especially Israel, have every reason to feel grateful for the vital assistance they received in intercepting Iran’s missile and drone onslaught, they might also ask what the U.S. can now do differently to deter Iran from further aggression. . . . Tehran will see this weekend’s direct attack on Israel as a victory—their own—for their ability to continue threatening Israel and destabilizing the Middle East with impunity.

Israel, of course, must respond differently. Our target cannot simply be the Iranian proxies that surround our country and that have waged war on us since October 7, but, as the Saudis call it, “the head of the snake.”