Given the many victories won by Bashar al-Assad and his allies in Syria over the past year, a growing consensus among pundits and foreign-policy experts holds that America and Europe have no choice but to put up with his continued rule—and with a permanent Iranian and Russian presence in the country. Frederic Hof is unconvinced:
Only by returning to the totally discredited belief that what happens in Syria stays in Syria could [this defeatist approach] be remotely defensible as the basis for policy. Syria will continue to roil politically even if all armed opponents of the regime were to surrender today. Try as he may, Assad will not be able to kill, torture, or terrorize quickly or thoroughly enough to command cooperation, much less obedience. And the Kremlin’s concern for the Syrian economy and its rehabilitation extends no farther than whatever morsels—oil and gas fields particularly—can be picked off by the Russian oligarchy. Putin calculates that what passes for the West, given its fear of refugee flows, will pay for Syria’s reconstruction and will do so through the Assad regime. If he is right, then Western taxpayers will hemorrhage euros and dollars indefinitely, with little to show for the expenditure.
He may well be right. A policy that “gets used” to Assad while chuckling over the mess the Russians have presumably bought themselves simply extends the American-led, European-abetted collapse of the West in Syria. . . .
Even if the West adheres to its morally vacuous and politically disastrous determination to do nothing to complicate or mitigate mass homicide in western Syria, it can—at least in principle—encourage and permit a governance alternative to Assad to emerge in Syria east of the Euphrates River, where the finishing military touches are being applied to Islamic State (IS). Iran, Russia, and the regime are alarmed by this possibility, and for good reason. A civilized Syrian alternative to Assad, particularly one arising from adept American diplomacy squaring the circle between Turkey and Syrian Kurds, could be attractive to all Syrians save the innermost circle of family and entourage. The absent alternative has been the missing anchor that has kept Assad afloat.
Whether the alarm of America’s adversaries over Washington’s proclaimed determination to stabilize eastern Syria is justified remains to be seen. The seven-year collapse of the West in Syria has fueled Russian ambitions globally and Iranian ambitions regionally. Without real resources, patience, and determination, that collapse will continue and accelerate.
Read more on Atlantic Council: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/syriasource/taking-a-stand-in-syria