On August 6, terrorists in the Gaza Strip began launching incendiary devices at Israeli towns, triggering IDF retaliation and a series of attacks and counterattacks that ended with a ceasefire on Monday. Alex Fishman examines where the weeks of violence leave Hamas:

During the three weeks [of violence] Israel closed the land and ocean passageways into the Strip [and] the number of unemployed there jumped by no less than 10 percent, as thousands lost their jobs and their livelihoods. Neither Yahya Sinwar, [the senior Hamas figure in the Strip], nor his people can bury these numbers with mere words. This last round of violence against Israel was a colossal failure for him and his people. . . . Sinwar tried to force Israel to the negotiating table in an effort to improve life in the Strip. He succeeded insofar as Israel indeed negotiated with Hamas through Egypt, Qatar, and the UN.

But what Hamas failed to do was to extract any concessions from either Jerusalem or from his interlocutors.

In the end, not only did Sinwar find himself back at square one, but the IDF used the attacks as an excuse to strike no less than 104 Hamas-affiliated targets within the enclave, thus delivering a blow to the organization’s infrastructure in the Strip.

About a week ago, Gaza was hit by its own wave of coronavirus, a new development that may have pushed Sinwar to end the current round of aggression. . . . The Strip is under complete lockdown at the moment, no movement is permitted from district to district, and schools and beaches are closed, [as are all] exits from the Strip. . . . Even if Israel wanted to throw Gaza an economic lifeline, the coronavirus has made it all but impossible.

The way the latest escalation ended is nothing but an invitation to the next round, which may end up being more violent.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.