While peace between Jerusalem and Khartoum is unlikely to bring the mutual economic benefits that accompany the deals with Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates, it offers much else to the Jewish state. Yoav Limor explains:

[F]rom an Arab-Muslim standpoint, the accord means another dent has been made in the wall of opposition Israel faces in the Arab world. Sudan . . . has now become the fifth Arab nation to recognize Israel, and by doing so it has further chipped at the notion that any progress between the Arab world and Israel is inextricably linked to the Palestinian issue.

[No less important] is the security issue. [Once] Iranian ships regularly docked at Port Sudan, en route to delivering anything from rockets and mortars to anti-tank missiles, explosives, and weapons to Hizballah in Lebanon and Hamas and Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip. . . . [I]t seems that the new agreement will make it possible to tighten further control over any terrorist activity on Sudanese soil.

This deals a significant blow to terrorist organizations, and especially to their chief patron, Iran, which is no doubt concerned about the growing number of smuggling routes being cordoned off, as well as the growing number of Muslim countries that are choosing to seek peace with Israel.

Tehran will undoubtedly carve out new smuggling routes to keep assisting its proxies in Lebanon and Gaza, and the ayatollahs will certainly do what they can to pressure Arab leaders against following in the footsteps of the UAE, Bahrain, and Sudan.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.