This evening the minor holiday of Tu b’Shvat begins, and some Jews will mark it by eating carob. Although Meir Soloveichik has argued that, thanks to this Ashkenazi custom, the “much-maligned fruit” became “an ultimate embodiment of Jewish vitality and endurance,” he admits that it is “remarkably unpleasant to eat.” The food writer Paola Gavin defends the culinary merits of the pods of the carob tree, and discusses their history:

Strangely enough, carob—also called h’ruv in Hebrew, and kharoub in Arabic—is not mentioned in the Hebrew Bible. It is, however, referred to in the Babylonian Talmud, which states that carob pods nourished the impoverished Rabbi Hanina ben Dosa for a whole week, from Shabbat to Shabbat (Ta’anit 24b).

The carob tree is a large, flowering evergreen native to the Levant, where it has grown for millennia. Carob seeds were discovered in Jericho and Haifa that date back to the Neolithic era, or New Stone Age. . . . Throughout the Middle East the pods are given to children as a sweet snack to chew. In ancient times, before the arrival of sugar cane or sugar beets, carob was widely used for sweetening throughout the eastern Mediterranean. Carob molasses is still a traditional sweetener in Crete.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.