First, I want to thank the respondents for their replies to my essay on the postmodern military. I have learned from all of them, both here and in their other writings. I believe we largely agree on the general, unfortunate state of military strategy and operational art. Yet some differences of opinion remain, particularly on more practical and concrete security issues.

My most significant dispute is with Edward Luttwak’s reply. He seems to imply that I overstate, to a great degree, my critique of the IDF high command’s poor operational capabilities. If I have understood him correctly, he also believes that such serious deficiencies as the unfortunate state of the reserve brigades are attributable to the IDF’s justifiable (in his view) decision to put its priorities elsewhere: missile-interception technologies, the Namer armored personnel carrier, sophisticated warplanes, and so forth. All of these investments were, he maintains, major successes. The main “failure” of the IDF’s chiefs of staff, Luttwak sarcastically remarks, was that they did not “confront the cabinet to obtain permission for all-out offensives against Hamas and Hizballah . . . in a moment of unusual tranquility, regardless of world reactions.”

Most of these claims are misguided. The neglect of ground forces extends far beyond the reserve brigades. Regular ground forces in the IDF were reduced in size, insufficiently trained, and poorly equipped. This is not merely a question of priorities. The IDF’s budget could easily have supported all its ground forces while incorporating the technological innovations Luttwak endorses. The defense budget grew steadily over the past two decades, and the expensive equipment Luttwak refers to accounts for only a fraction of overall expenditures. But the IDF brass simply dismissed ground capabilities because they accepted misguided national-security dogmas and military doctrines, while tolerating massive spending inefficiencies. For instance: roughly half the defense budget is allocated to salaries, many of which are redundant and highly inflated; note that the IDF’s chief of staff earns significantly more than his American counterpart.

I would also argue that the new technologies—even setting aside their negative effects on various aspects of national security, such as creating to a defensive mindset which extends Israel’s conflicts—are far from the success story Luttwak seems to believe they are. While they provide an effective defense against small-scale terrorist missile attacks, they do so at a very high cost. Moreover, in the case of a large-scale war, overwhelming attacks can saturate even the most sophisticated high-tech defenses. This is a danger the IDF has simply disregarded.

The last point I will make is that Luttwak is wrong to suggest that the heads of the IDF may have wished to launch an offensive strike “against Hamas and Hizballah” but refrained because they were too timid to “confront the cabinet.” In reality, the security establishment actively pushed back against cabinet initiatives to adopt a more aggressive approach. True, these weren’t calls for a full-scale war of offensive maneuver, but for smaller-scale special operations. Nevertheless, the fact remains: the IDF opposed offensive suggestions made by the cabinet: the reverse of what Luttwak seems to believe.

I find Victor Davis Hanson’s analysis both illuminating and complementary to my own. While I focus on the professional aspects of national-security concepts, theories, and military doctrines, he provides a necessary and insightful cultural, political, and sociological analysis. Undoubtedly, he is correct in identifying shifts in culture, values, and ethics as the backdrop to the professional changes I present.

But there is a specific reason for my focus. Culture and values can change very quickly, especially when a nation has faced a serious and successful attack, such as Pearl Harbor or September 11 in the U.S., or the Hamas attack on October 7, 2023. With some rather pathological, highly ideological exceptions, most people tend to abandon their pacific and naïve positions quite expeditiously when they are brutally attacked.

In Israel, we witnessed such a shift after October 7. This is hardly surprising, as the villages and kibbutzim that were targeted—whose inhabitants were slaughtered, tortured, raped, and kidnapped—had been left-wing symbols of the desire for peace and cooperation with the people of Gaza. Some of the victims had dedicated much of their lives to helping their Palestinian neighbors and advocating coexistence. Yet, when it became clear that Gazans were indifferent to these efforts, and their jihadist, eliminationist anti-Semitism superseded everything else, many of those who survived the atrocities reversed their perspective almost instantly.

In such horrendous moments, a nation falls back on its last resort: the military. Naturally, people expect to find a professional fighting force, willing and able to impose its will on the enemy. In other words, we assume that the military maintains its war capabilities and operationally decisive preparedness even in peacetime—just in case everything else fails.

In Israel, what we found was an army leadership in a professional crisis. This crisis resulted from a long intellectual deterioration during which the leadership succumbed to doctrines that ignore the fundamental truths of war. It turns out that our values can shift quickly, but professional ignorance and folly are far more difficult and slower to overturn. This is why I emphasize the professional aspects of the decline, even as I fully acknowledge Hanson’s emphasis on the cultural, societal, and normative shifts that accompany it.

Two last points on Hanson’s response. First—and this applies to all three responses—I dispute the assertion that Israel achieved “brilliant operational and tactical victories” that supposedly failed to translate into “favorable strategic resolutions.” The IDF’s problems are manifest even at the operational level. And tactical success is meaningless if it does not lead to a decisive operational advantage. Despite Gaza’s relatively small size, it was never treated as an operational front: military plans were small-scale and partial, suffering from a lack of an overarching operational rationale. Victory in war requires a comprehensive plan that gives meaning and purpose to tactical achievements. Without it, we are left with temporary successes and a futile expectation of the enemy’s surrender.

Moreover, as often happens when a strategy is primarily one of attrition, tactical successes were overstated and inflated. I am not particularly impressed by the level of physical destruction in some areas of Gaza, so recently given attention by the American president. While the destruction may have been tactically necessary given the conditions of close-quarter fighting in an urban environment (CQB and MOUT in military jargon), victory does not stem from demolition. A fleet of D9 bulldozers or piles of emulsion explosives cannot substitute for operational art.

My last point relates to Hanson’s accurate remarks about issues such as “disproportionality, high casualties among the enemy,” and “culpability for striking first.” Today, at least in Israel, these are not merely cultural and ethical questions but legal ones. The Israeli military is saturated with lawyers, and combatants and commanders are constantly threatened by domestic and international legal action, which serves to limit or prevent the use of military means necessary for victory. These theoretical, self-congratulatory, and nonsensical constructs have become institutionalized to a debilitating degree, serving only the enemy. This new aspect of war has become a substantial institutional constraint. And it should be noted that, since these restrictions significantly extend the war—taking a heavy toll on the civilian population—it is doubtful that they serve any humanitarian purpose.

Finally, I come to H.R. McMaster’s thoughtful remarks. I see them as complementing my essay but from a more military-professional perspective than the others. I believe McMaster agrees, as do I, with Hanson’s observation that “the only thing worse than war is defeat,” and I believe Hanson agrees with him, as do I, that “military and civilian leaders should study military history.” A large part of our security problems undoubtedly stem from this intellectual negligence.

Yet there are a few points on which I am not in complete agreement with General McMaster. He, like Luttwak and Hanson, has what strikes me as an overly sanguine view of the “successful military operations” in Gaza. But my more important disagreement regards his emphasis on “sustainable political outcomes” of the military campaign.

McMaster’s political aims in Gaza are clearly articulated: “breaking the cycle of violence, restoring hope, reforming education, and isolating populations from ideologies that foment hatred and perpetuate violence,” as a necessary means of achieving an “enduring victory.” These are worthy goals, but can it be denied that Israel’s military actions in Gaza were insufficient to achieve them?

Israel set out to destroy both Hamas’s military capabilities and its civilian rule. Yet, the IDF failed to accomplish either objective—along with a third: the return of the hostages. The only excuse is that a year and three months were not enough. Given the asymmetrical nature of the conflict, that should be seen as an admission of failure. And so, yet again, we find that military lack of professionalism underpins all other failures.

McMaster’s political objectives warrant another observation. While one can understand the moral desire to distinguish Hamas from other civilians in Gaza, in reality, this distinction is largely artificial. When describing his tours in the Middle East, McMaster writes about fighting against “modern-day barbarians who are the enemies of all civilized people.” This reflects the political reality in Gaza, and not just for Hamas’s official members. The terrible truth is that Hamas enjoys massive popularity, and almost every household and family in Gaza has a direct affiliation with the organization.

And so, the re-education project we must confront in Gaza is immense, further highlighting the insufficient military gains. Israel paid an enormous price to end up without any real control over the Gaza Strip—a control that is a prerequisite to pursuing McMaster’s political objectives.

This failure then is first and foremost a military one. The Israeli security establishment has a wrongheaded strategic mindset, malfunctioning military doctrines, and inadequate intellectual training. To survive, Israel must rid itself of the degenerate “RMA” generation—both in politics and in its security establishment—reform its armed forces, and return to classical military strategy in both theory and practice.

Only such a major overhaul will enable Israel to conduct quick and decisive military campaigns when the situation demands it, even when caught by surprise. The transition must begin with a shift in military mindset, the necessity of which and the direction it should take are, I believe, largely agreed upon by Hanson, McMaster, and myself.

I once again thank the respondents for their valuable criticisms, thoughtful remarks, and informative additions.