In 1948, he served as a stark counter-example to the view (which he mostly held) that history is driven by material factors and not by great leaders.
If the Jews could hang on through the tough early months, he thought, they would grow considerably stronger while their opponents might well become weaker. And so it proved to be.
On the eve of Israel’s statehood in 1948, with the massed forces of five Arab nations threatening invasion, David Ben-Gurion picked a fight with his own army. Why?
A long-accepted wisdom has it that just days before the state’s birth, its founders settled two burning issues in a pair of closely decided votes. The wisdom is half-wrong.
Contrary to the view propagated by an influential Israeli editorial board, blame for the alleged Palestinian “catastrophe” of 1948 lies with Arab intransigence.
“A five-year-old boy didn’t merely recite the traditional four questions, but asked them, as if he wanted to be told why a seder in besieged. . .
The latest book seeking to turn liberals against Israel relies on an erroneous and morally obtuse reading of how America came to support the Zionist enterprise.
Is there anyone among today’s Israeli leaders who can truly claim the mantle of those who went before? If not, why not?
Why does refusing to recognize Israel as a Jewish state remain the key obstacle to peace? For good and sufficient reason.
Contrary to claims of an “Arab-Jewish” identity pre-1948, the place of Jews in Arab lands was always conditional.
An editor at the New Republic has written a book claiming that the creation of the state of Israel was illegitimate and American recognition of. . .
Israel is still fighting its war of independence. A secure peace will be possible only once the Jewish character of the state is widely accepted.
The 1950s saw a population-and-asset exchange between Israel and its neighbors that was tacitly recognized by Arab leaders at the time—but is conveniently ignored today.