Analyzing Islamic State’s military successes and failures thus far, Hillel Frisch notes that after its stunning victories in 2014 over the ill-trained and poorly motivated Iraqi army, IS has had trouble defeating the Syrian and Kurdish militaries, and would likely be at a far greater disadvantage against the IDF. True, there are reasons to fear IS will expand its control in Syria and from there into Lebanon and Jordan, giving it an opportunity to attack Israel. Nevertheless, Frisch concludes, the greater threat to Israel lies elsewhere:

[The significance] of an IS takeover in Syria to Israeli security interests is not so much the IS threat per se, but rather the Iranian reaction to the takeover, and the threat such a reaction would pose to Israel. Israel must meet the Iranian challenge [by establishing] clear red lines, the most important of which is the prevention of the transfer of advanced missile launchers and rockets through both seaports and airports in Lebanon and [a Syrian rump state outside of IS control]. Israel must develop the intelligence capabilities to monitor these facilities, if it has not already done so.

[Furthermore, Israel should] clearly signal to Iran that infringement of these red lines will result in the partial or complete destruction of the installations in question. . . . [It must also establish a] geographical red line in southern Lebanon beyond which an Iranian presence will not be tolerated.

Israel should [likewise] consider an IS assault on Jabal al-Druze, [an area of Syria bordering Jordan and near the Golan Heights] as a red line, automatically initiating a forceful Israeli response. . . . Israel should signal to the organization that it will forcefully oppose any IS attacks or subversion against Jordan [and that] any attack on Israel or Israeli citizens outside Israel, or any attempts to begin operations in Judea and Samaria, will meet with a disproportionate counterattack on IS personnel and infrastructure.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.