Rafah’s Jewish History

According to reports in Arabic media, IDF units in Rafah reached the Mediterranean coast this weekend, having made their way through this strategically crucial border city. The Jerusalem Post considers Rafah’s long Jewish history:

The Jewish presence in Rafah dates back to the Hasmonean era (167–63 BCE) when King Alexander Yannai of Judea conquered the town. Rafah remained under Jewish control until the Roman general Pompey the Great captured it in 63 BCE. . . . Rafah was noted in significant works such as Strabo’s Geographica and the Oxyrhynchus Papyri during the Roman period, highlighting its prominence in the region.

The Jewish community of Rafah probably reached a high point during the Islamic era, and especially during the 9th and 10th centuries.

Despite facing declines around 1080, when many Jews migrated to Ashkelon, the community experienced a resurgence in the 12th century. Liturgical poems from this time reference the Jewish community in Rafah, although scholarly debates continue regarding the extent and continuity of this presence.

During the medieval period, the Jewish community in Rafah was part of a broader network of Jewish settlements in the region. Notable medieval rabbis, such as Rabbi Tsedakah Halevi, contributed to the community’s spiritual and intellectual life. Historical records from the Cairo Geniza, a trove of Jewish manuscript fragments, provide evidence of correspondence and legal disputes involving the Jewish community in Rafah. Under Ottoman rule, Rafah’s Jewish community engaged in various economic activities, including agriculture and trade.

Read more at Jerusalem Post

More about: Ancient Israel, Gaza Strip, Hasmoneans, Land of Israel

Hamas Has Its Own Day-After Plan

While Hamas’s leaders continue to reject the U.S.-backed ceasefire proposal, they have hardly been neglecting diplomacy. Ehud Yaari explains:

Over the past few weeks, Hamas leaders have been engaged in talks with other Palestinian factions and select Arab states to find a formula for postwar governance in the Gaza Strip. Held mainly in Qatar and Egypt, the negotiations have not matured into a clear plan so far, but some forms of cooperation are emerging on the ground in parts of the embattled enclave.

Hamas officials have informed their interlocutors that they are willing to support the formation of either a “technocratic government” or one composed of factions that agree to Palestinian “reconciliation.” They have also insisted that security issues not be part of this government’s authority. In other words, Hamas is happy to let others shoulder civil responsibilities while it focuses on rebuilding its armed networks behind the scenes.

Among the possibilities Hamas is investigating is integration into the Palestinian Authority (PA), the very body that many experts in Israel and in the U.S. believe should take over Gaza after the war ends. The PA president Mahmoud Abbas has so far resisted any such proposals, but some of his comrades in the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) are less certain:

On June 12, several ex-PLO and PA officials held an unprecedented meeting in Ramallah and signed an initiative calling for the inclusion of additional factions, meaning Hamas. The PA security services had blocked previous attempts to arrange such meetings in the West Bank. . . . Hamas has already convinced certain smaller PLO factions to get on board with its postwar model.

With generous help from Qatar, Hamas also started a campaign in March asking unaffiliated Palestinian activists from Arab countries and the diaspora to press for a collaborative Hamas role in postwar Gaza. Their main idea for promoting this plan is to convene a “Palestinian National Congress” with hundreds of delegates. Preparatory meetings have already been held in Britain, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Qatar, and more are planned for the United States, Spain, Belgium, Australia, and France.

If the U.S. and other Western countries are serious about wishing to see Hamas defeated, and all the more so if they have any hopes for peace, they will have to convey to all involved that any association with the terrorist group will trigger ostracization and sanctions. That Hamas doesn’t already appear toxic to these various interlocutors is itself a sign of a serious failure.

Read more at Washington Institute for Near East Policy

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, Palestinian Authority