With Passover behind us, two reserve divisions mobilized, and Hamas refusing all offers in the ongoing hostage negotiations, it seems increasingly likely that the IDF will at last enter the southern tip of the Gaza Strip. Meir Ben-Shabbat explains why the operation is necessary—regardless of U.S. or international pressure—and assesses the military situation:

The IDF’s starting position for this operation is better than at the beginning of the campaign in the northern Gaza Strip or the Khan Yunis area. The enemy will now be entering combat with a command echelon that has been depleted, with many fighters dead, wounded, or arrested, [while] the IDF will have replenished its forces, updated its intelligence, and improved its fighters’ operational combat-worthiness through lessons learned from previous stages of the fighting.

Yet, Ben-Shabbat observes, Hamas will have some new advantages as well:

Its logistical preparedness has improved thanks to humanitarian aid entering the Strip, and it is equipped with fuel and food that allow prolonged survival in tunnels. Additionally, the terrorists draw encouragement from the pressures exerted on Israel to minimize casualties. . . . Above all, they are emboldened by their demonstrated ability to survive the IDF onslaught so far and the fact that even after over 200 days of fighting, Hamas continues to be the central power in the Gaza Strip.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.