Having vowed to retake every inch of his country’s pre-2011 territory, and made clear his disdain for an actual cease-fire, the Syrian president evidently believes he can only benefit from fighting on. After all, opposition forces are suffering from both military defeat and defections to jihadist groups, Islamic State is on the defensive, Russian and Iranian support seems unlimited, and no substantial Western aid is forthcoming for the rebels. Nonetheless, argues Ari Heistein, much is not going in Damascus’ favor:

[T]he Assad regime’s ability to function as a fighting and governing force is being steadily degraded by the grinding civil war and the growing cracks in its bases of support. Therefore, [it] is unlikely to expand its control over Syrian territory dramatically in the near future, [primarily because of] domestic issues such as its declining ability to maintain a centralized and cohesive fighting force and poor governance in areas under regime control.

Because the battered and exhausted Syrian Arab Army is spread so thin, foreign forces and local militias play an outsized role in the civil war. The decentralization of military control throughout the country has accentuated conflicting interests among different pro-regime groups, which has even resulted in clashes among these forces on the battlefield. . . . The Russian and Iranian military interventions have stabilized the Assad regime, but not facilitated its conquest of significant swaths of territory by any measure. . . .

As for governing the civilian population, there has been a growing voice of discontent even among the Alawite backbone of the regime, as evident from protests against corruption and security lapses as well as the Alawite religious establishment’s disavowal of the Assad regime. Since the outbreak of the war, the notorious corruption among Syrian government officials is reported to have become even more severe, as the steep decline in the value of Syrian currency has led state employees to supplement their wages with bribes. . . .

[Even if the regime does win back more territory], controlling a hostile population will present a nearly impossible task, considering that many of the regime’s local networks for control have been destroyed. [In short, it is a] fantasy that [Assad’s] overstretched, fragmented, and corrupt regime can reconquer and hold much more of Syria.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.