Despite the Jewish state’s relatively good security, its favorable diplomatic condition, and its thriving economy, a recent study reports that two-thirds of Israelis rate their country’s situation as “so-so” or “bad.” Yedidia Stern connects some of this pessimism to the idea that extremism is growing on all sides: that ultra-Orthodox Jews are ferociously opposed to the army and to Israeli society in general, that religious Zionists are in the grip of uncompromising messianic fervor, that elected Arab politicians give cell phones to jailed terrorists, and that the post-Zionist left is poisoned by self-loathing. Although one can find evidence for each of these perceptions, Stern argues, they paint a wholly unrealistic picture. (Free registration may be required.)

[In fact, it] appears that the internal conversation in each sector is shifting toward the center and that the swirling centrifuges that push us apart are slowing down.

Ḥaredim are increasingly integrating into Israeli society. Nearly 50 percent of ḥaredi men and more than 75 percent of ḥaredi women have joined the workforce. Ḥaredim in their thousands are flocking to colleges and universities. While Ḥaredim still prefer social seclusion, do not serve in the military, and are far from internalizing liberal values, they are now involved in the making of national decisions, participate in the Zionist project, and are feeling the touch of Adam Smith’s “invisible hand,” which within a generation will raise this impoverished group to a middle-class income level. . . .

The typical positions of Israel’s Arab citizens regarding the state are different from the confrontational stance of their political leadership. According to [one survey], 55 percent of Israeli Arabs are proud to be Israeli. When asked which identity is most important to them, they mainly choose their religious (29 percent), Israeli (25 percent!), or Arab (24 percent) identity. Only one-eighth see “Palestinian” as most important. . . .

[Another] study found substantial overlap between the religious Zionist camp’s attitude toward democracy and that of the Israeli public as a whole. While religious Zionists are almost monolithically on the right, they display a plurality of views on questions of religion and state. Finally, the majority of the left is far from the unpatriotic stereotype attached to it. . . . [A]bout two-thirds report they are proud to be Israeli and four out of five feel part of the country and its problems. . . . [In short,] Israel is not what you think.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.