Since the two sides faced off in the Second Lebanon War of 2006, both Hizballah and Israel have made extensive preparations for the next conflict. Hizballah has greatly expanded its rocket arsenal, has gained substantial tactical experience from fighting in Syria, and has greater access than ever to Iranian supplies; its likely plan is to overwhelm Israeli defenses with rocket and mortar fire—attacking targets not just in the north but throughout the country while conducting raids with ground troops. For its part, the IDF has studied the mistakes of the previous war and has made clear that the next one is likely to be catastrophic for Lebanon. Michael Eisenstadt and Jeffrey White explore the many likely scenarios that could lead to war, what that war would look like, and how the U.S. might be able to prevent it:

For Israel, a war of this magnitude and intensity will have major political, economic, and social consequences well beyond any military outcomes. It would mark the first time since the War of Independence that Israel, throughout its territory, would be a major battleground, with the population and infrastructure exposed to direct, and likely sustained, attack. Even given probable Israeli successes against Hizballah and improvements in civil defense, this would be a true test of the country’s resilience. . . .

Clearly, the overwhelming imperative for Washington is to prevent such a war in the first place. Yet U.S. policy in recent years may have made such a war more likely; by not providing more robust support to the non-Salafist opposition [to Bashar al-Assad] in Syria, the United States made the success of the Assad regime and its allies more likely. This may embolden them to build on their military successes and overreach—just as Hizballah’s success in forcing Israel out of Lebanon in 2000, and Hamas’s success in forcing Israel from Gaza in 2005, caused Hizballah and Hamas to engage in provocations that led to additional wars. Accordingly, Washington should quietly warn Hizballah, Iran, and Syria against actions that could lead to war, and signal that it will not restrain Israel if Hizballah acts recklessly or provocatively. . . .

In the event of war, the U.S. should provide Israel political cover and buy for it the time needed to strike a decisive blow against Hizballah—Iran’s foremost regional proxy. The United States should continue to provide Israel with the military means to sustain an intense and perhaps prolonged war against Hizballah. . . .

Finally, the United States should support termination of the conflict only when conditions for an enduring ceasefire have been met. Making clear to Hizballah that the United States will not seek a premature halt to a war that could make Hizballah—and the Assad regime—more vulnerable to their local Arab rivals and enemies may be the best way to prevent such a war in the first place.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.