At a recent soccer match in Tehran between the two countries’ teams, Syrian and Iranian fans began shouting invectives at each other, highlighting the fact that, despite their governments’ close alliance, the two peoples share little mutual affection. Amir Taheri notes the feebleness of the Iranian regime’s efforts to explain to its populace why it is involved in Syria:

The initial [explanation] provided by the Khomeinist authorities was that Iran is fighting in Syria to prevent the fall of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime, which had been an ally during the war with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in the 1980s and is now a member of the “Resistance Front” led by Iran.

That . . . . failed to convince many people, even within the regime’s base. Then another reason was cited: Iran was fighting in Syria to prevent the destruction of Shiite holy shrines. Official media published lists of such shrines, sometimes with photographs.

But that, too, was challenged by “troublemakers” who picked holes in the regime’s shaky claims. More than 90 percent of Syrian “Shiite holy sites” turned out to be burial places of ancient Jewish prophets or Sunni Muslim theologians and scholars. . . .

[Furthermore], a closer look at Syrian realities shows that the Russo-Irano-Turkish scheme [to divide the country into spheres of influence] is doomed to fail. From what I know of Syria, a country I have observed and visited since 1970, despite almost seven years of tragedy, the sense of “Syrian-ness” is still strong enough to frustrate putative imperial appetites. . . .

Syria is not Lebanon, where Shiites, accounting for a third of the population, have always looked to Iran as a protector. Tehran’s attempts to cast Syrian Alawites, [the ruling religious groups], as “almost Shiites,” and thus deserving the same “protection” as Lebanese Shiites, have failed. Not a single ayatollah has agreed to cancel the countless historic fatwas that castigate Alawites as “heretics” or even crypto-Zoroastrians.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.