The Trump administration has been encouraging the establishment of an alliance of so-called moderate Arab states, consisting of the Persian Gulf states, Egypt, and Jordan, that would both share U.S. interests and serve as a counterweight to Iran and its network of proxies and puppets while also opposing Islamists. Reportedly, the White House believes that these countries, several of which have overt or covert relations with Israel, could also play a role in solving the Palestinian question. While these states have constructive roles to play, argues Joshua Krasna, neither Jerusalem nor Washington should expect too much from them:

[D]espite certain commonalities among its constituents (and between them and Israel), the “moderate Sunni camp” is essentially a theoretical construct representing the current activities, and the [desire for leadership], of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In contrast to the so-called Shiite camp high-handedly controlled by Tehran, [these countries don’t constitute a unified group] capable of meaningfully shaping regional politics, both because of Saudi Arabia’s lack of the means [to accomplish its goals] and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s questionable judgment in particular, and because of a lack of congruence between the interests and agendas of Egypt and Jordan, on the one hand, and those of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the other.

The openness on the part of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states toward Israel undoubtedly presents an important strategic opportunity. Relations between Israel and the Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, have advanced significantly in recent years, boosted dramatically by their common struggle against the nuclear deal with Iran during the Obama administration. . . . They and Israel are united by concerns over Iran’s aggressive policy and by uncertainty regarding the extent of protection they can expect from the United States. It is important that Israel proceed wisely and discreetly to take advantage of this opportunity and cultivate bilateral ties with each and every one of the relevant Arab states.

The impulse to regard [these states] as a single bloc is [thus] admittedly enticing, but would be unproductive in the long run. Nor does it accord with reality, given that this “bloc” is not an actual entity and has no definitive leadership. Such an approach is likely to hold relations with each of the various constituents hostage to relations with the others and, in particular, dependent on relations with Riyadh. It is preferable to [pursue] understandings with each state separately. . . .

[In addition], the notion that it is possible to “resolve” the Israel-Palestinian issue by sidelining and bypassing the Palestinians, dealing instead with distant, rich, authoritarian Arab leaders, is illusory. For years Israel has refrained from engaging in peace processes with groups of states and instead focused conscientiously on bilateral negotiations in order to avoid rigid positions stemming from posturing as well as attempts at coercion. Furthermore, it is unrealistic to expect that any Arab leader would . . . establish relations with Israel without regard for the Palestinian issue.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.