Can Israel continue to be both Jewish and democratic? According to Evelyn Gordon, that depends on your definition of democracy. The answer is emphatically yes, if democracy is understood—correctly—as a system of government that ensures the consent of the governed and such basic rights as freedom of speech. The problems begin with those who disdain “procedural” democracy in favor of “substantive” democracy—by which they mean, writes Gordon, “less a system of government than a religion”:

Like any religion, [substantive democracy] contains both positive and negative commandments that govern not only political but also moral and social, life; the only difference is that these commandments are called “rights” instead. Thus, for instance, legalizing gay marriage is obligatory, because there’s a “right to marry,” but restricting abortion is forbidden, because a woman has a “right to control her own body.” These positions have nothing to do with the mechanisms of government and everything to do with dictating social and moral norms. . . .

The problem with treating democracy as a religion, however, is that no two religions are ever wholly compatible. One cannot, for instance, simultaneously be a practicing Jew and a practicing Muslim, because Jewish and Islamic law sometimes clash. So, too, can the commandments of Judaism and substantive democracy. . . .

[By contrast,] procedural democracy isn’t a competing religion; it’s a system of government. And this particular system of government is essential to the Jewish state’s survival, for one simple reason: any Jewish state . . . must be one where large numbers of Jews with often contradictory opinions and values . . . can somehow live together. And no system of government is better at enabling people with wildly different opinions to coexist than democracy. Judaism is Israel’s soul . . . ; democracy is Israel’s body. . . . Like any living creature, the Jewish state needs both soul and body to survive. On its own, neither is enough.

Before exploding electronics in Lebanon seized the attention of the Israeli public, debate there had focused on the Philadelphi Corridor—the strip of land between Gaza and Egypt—and whether the IDF can afford to withdraw from it. Egypt has opposed Israeli control of the corridor, which is crucial to Hamas’s supply lines, and Egyptian objections likely prevented Israel from seizing it earlier in the war. Yet, argues Mariam Wahba, Egypt in the long run only stands to lose by letting Hamas use the corridor, and has proved incapable of effectively sealing it off:

Ultimately, this moment presents an opportunity for the United States to hold Egypt’s feet to the fire.

To press Cairo, the United States should consider conditioning future aid on Cairo’s willingness to cooperate. This should include a demand for greater transparency and independent oversight to verify Egyptian claims about the tunnels. Congress ought to hold hearings to understand better Egypt’s role and its compliance as a U.S. ally. Despite Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s nine trips to the Middle East since the start of the war, there has been little clarity on how Egypt intends to fulfill its role as a mediator.

By refusing to acknowledge Israel’s legitimate security concerns, Egypt is undermining its own interests, prolonging the war in Gaza, and further destabilizing its relationship with Jerusalem. It is time for Egyptian leaders either to admit their inability to secure the border and seek help from Israel and America, or to risk being perceived as enablers of Hamas and its terrorist campaign.