In the aftermath of the recent nuclear agreement, Hamas now stands poised to get more support from both the Islamic Republic and its rival, Saudi Arabia. Khaled Abu Toameh writes:

Emboldened by the deal, Hamas is now seeking to reap its fruits by tightening its grip on the Gaza Strip with the help of Iran. This, of course, is bad news for Hamas’s rivals in the Palestinian arena, [especially] the Palestinian Authority, as well as all those who still believe in the peace process between Israelis and Palestinians.

The nuclear deal has also driven Saudi Arabia and other Sunni Muslim countries to restore their relations with Hamas. Their goal is to entice Hamas and its patrons in the Muslim Brotherhood to become part of an anti-Iran Sunni coalition in the Arab world. . . .

According to Palestinian sources in the Gaza Strip, the Iranians have already resumed their aid to Hamas’s military wing. Relations between Iran and Hamas were strained four years ago, after Hamas refused to support Iran’s ally, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, in his fight against rebel groups. Hamas officials are now hoping that the nuclear deal and the lifting of sanctions imposed on Iran will lead to a dramatic increase in Tehran’s support for terror groups in the region.

On Tuesday, representatives of Hamas met with their counterparts from Fatah—the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) once led by Yasir Arafat that now governs parts of the West Bank—in Beijing to discuss possible reconciliation. While it is unlikely that these talks will yield any more progress than the many previous rounds, they constitute a significant step in China’s increasing attempts to involve itself in the Middle East on the side of Israel’s enemies.

By contrast, writes Tuvia Gering, Taiwan has been quick and consistent in its condemnations of Hamas and Iran and its expressions of sympathy with Israel:

Support from Taipei goes beyond words. Taiwan’s appointee in Tel Aviv and de-facto ambassador, Abby Lee, has been busy aiding hostage families, adopting the most affected kibbutzim in southern Israel, and volunteering with farmers. Taiwan recently pledged more than half a million dollars to Israel for critical initiatives, including medical and communications supplies for local municipalities. This follows earlier aid from Taiwan to an organization helping Israeli soldiers and families immediately after the October 7 attack.

The reasons why are not hard to fathom:

In many ways, Taiwan sees a reflection of itself in Israel—two vibrant democracies facing threats from hostile neighbors. Both nations wield substantial economic and technological prowess, and both heavily depend on U.S. military exports and diplomacy. Taipei also sees Israel as a “role model” for what Taiwan should aspire to be, citing its unwavering determination and capabilities to defend itself.

On a deeper level, Taiwanese leaders seem to view Israel’s war with Hamas and Iran as an extension of a greater struggle between democracy and autocracy.

Gering urges Israel to reciprocate these expressions of friendship and to take into account that “China has been going above and beyond to demonize the Jewish state in international forums.” Above all, he writes, Jerusalem should “take a firmer stance against China’s support for Hamas and Iran-backed terrorism, exposing the hypocrisy and repression that underpin its vision for a new global order.”