For some time, the major refugee camps under the Palestinians Authority’s jurisdiction have been considered “no-go” zones by its security forces. The reason: the presence within them of armed activists incensed at and hostile to Mahmoud Abbas. Noting recent incidents of violence between these groups and PA officials and police, Khaled Abu Toameh warns of the growing disintegration of the PA’s control of the territory it rules:

A quick chat with young Palestinians, including Fatah members, in any refugee camp in the West Bank will reveal a driving sense of betrayal. . . . In these camps, the PA seems as much the enemy as Israel. . . . More importantly, many of the camp activists believe that it is only a matter of time before Palestinians launch an intifada against the PA. . . .

[H]ostility toward the Palestinian Authority seems to have reached unprecedented heights among refugee camp residents. The feeling is that the PA leadership has done virtually nothing to improve their living conditions and that the real money is going to big cities such as Ramallah, Nablus, Bethlehem, and Hebron.

The PA, like most Arab countries, has spent years upon years lying to the camp residents, telling them that they should remain in their misery because one day they will return to their families’ former homes inside Israel. Adding to this extraordinarily extended effort of deceit, the Palestinian Authority has marginalized the refugee camp residents, cutting them out of any process of state-building. It appears that the residents have had enough.

Abbas’s talk of establishing an independent Palestinian state is hard to reconcile with the “security chaos” in the territories under his control. Hamas, of course, is cheering on the sidelines as it watches the PA-controlled territories going to hell.

On Tuesday, representatives of Hamas met with their counterparts from Fatah—the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) once led by Yasir Arafat that now governs parts of the West Bank—in Beijing to discuss possible reconciliation. While it is unlikely that these talks will yield any more progress than the many previous rounds, they constitute a significant step in China’s increasing attempts to involve itself in the Middle East on the side of Israel’s enemies.

By contrast, writes Tuvia Gering, Taiwan has been quick and consistent in its condemnations of Hamas and Iran and its expressions of sympathy with Israel:

Support from Taipei goes beyond words. Taiwan’s appointee in Tel Aviv and de-facto ambassador, Abby Lee, has been busy aiding hostage families, adopting the most affected kibbutzim in southern Israel, and volunteering with farmers. Taiwan recently pledged more than half a million dollars to Israel for critical initiatives, including medical and communications supplies for local municipalities. This follows earlier aid from Taiwan to an organization helping Israeli soldiers and families immediately after the October 7 attack.

The reasons why are not hard to fathom:

In many ways, Taiwan sees a reflection of itself in Israel—two vibrant democracies facing threats from hostile neighbors. Both nations wield substantial economic and technological prowess, and both heavily depend on U.S. military exports and diplomacy. Taipei also sees Israel as a “role model” for what Taiwan should aspire to be, citing its unwavering determination and capabilities to defend itself.

On a deeper level, Taiwanese leaders seem to view Israel’s war with Hamas and Iran as an extension of a greater struggle between democracy and autocracy.

Gering urges Israel to reciprocate these expressions of friendship and to take into account that “China has been going above and beyond to demonize the Jewish state in international forums.” Above all, he writes, Jerusalem should “take a firmer stance against China’s support for Hamas and Iran-backed terrorism, exposing the hypocrisy and repression that underpin its vision for a new global order.”