As the U.S. has increased economic pressure on Iran and made clear that it is considering increased political and military pressure as well, Israel has used superior air power and intelligence to destroy Iranian military installations in Syria. When, last week, the Gaza-based terrorist group Palestinian Islamic Jihad began launching rockets and mortars at Israeli civilians, was it acting on the orders of a Tehran eager to push back? Jonathan Spyer writes:

Palestinian Islamic Jihad is a wholly owned franchise of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). While the apparent “motive” for its commencement of rocket fire was the killing of three of its militants by the IDF after a failed IED attack, this incident would not normally have been of sufficient magnitude to generate the largest barrage of rockets since Operation Protective Edge in 2014. It is therefore probable that the escalation in Gaza . . . was an example of Iran’s ability to mobilize a proxy on one front to place pressure on an adversary in response to events taking place in another arena.

Yet [last] week’s events also demonstrate Iran’s limitations. Hamas itself is not a wholly owned franchise of Tehran. And the joint interest of Israel, Hamas, and Egypt in avoiding a descent to a 2014-style conflagration served to put a lid on the escalation. . . .

Further east, however, in the . . . 30 percent of Syria east of the Euphrates, the Iranians may find an arena more to their liking. Here, a fledgling, U.S.-associated and Kurdish-dominated [political] authority rules over a population of about 4 million people, including many Sunni Arabs. In this situation, the IRGC’s methods of agitation, assassinations, and fomenting unrest from below are directly relevant.

Unidentified gunmen are already operating in this area. A prominent Kurdish official, Omar Alloush, was assassinated on March 15. Graffiti denouncing [Kurdish leaders] has appeared in the Arab-majority city of Raqqa. . . . More broadly, while Israeli air action may make the Iranians think twice about deploying heavy-weapons systems in Syria, the broader Iranian project of establishing local client militias and stationing proxy forces on Syria soil remains largely untouched and invulnerable to Israeli air action. . . .

[In Iraq as well], the evidence of recent years shows that where Iran enjoys an advantage over its rivals in such arenas is in its greater ability to utilize paramilitary and terrorist methods. . . . Iran is strongest in Lebanon and Assad-controlled Syria, powerful and dangerous in Iraq, and potentially so in the Kurdish-controlled . . . part of Syria, and weaker and with fewer options in Yemen and Gaza.

On Tuesday, representatives of Hamas met with their counterparts from Fatah—the faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) once led by Yasir Arafat that now governs parts of the West Bank—in Beijing to discuss possible reconciliation. While it is unlikely that these talks will yield any more progress than the many previous rounds, they constitute a significant step in China’s increasing attempts to involve itself in the Middle East on the side of Israel’s enemies.

By contrast, writes Tuvia Gering, Taiwan has been quick and consistent in its condemnations of Hamas and Iran and its expressions of sympathy with Israel:

Support from Taipei goes beyond words. Taiwan’s appointee in Tel Aviv and de-facto ambassador, Abby Lee, has been busy aiding hostage families, adopting the most affected kibbutzim in southern Israel, and volunteering with farmers. Taiwan recently pledged more than half a million dollars to Israel for critical initiatives, including medical and communications supplies for local municipalities. This follows earlier aid from Taiwan to an organization helping Israeli soldiers and families immediately after the October 7 attack.

The reasons why are not hard to fathom:

In many ways, Taiwan sees a reflection of itself in Israel—two vibrant democracies facing threats from hostile neighbors. Both nations wield substantial economic and technological prowess, and both heavily depend on U.S. military exports and diplomacy. Taipei also sees Israel as a “role model” for what Taiwan should aspire to be, citing its unwavering determination and capabilities to defend itself.

On a deeper level, Taiwanese leaders seem to view Israel’s war with Hamas and Iran as an extension of a greater struggle between democracy and autocracy.

Gering urges Israel to reciprocate these expressions of friendship and to take into account that “China has been going above and beyond to demonize the Jewish state in international forums.” Above all, he writes, Jerusalem should “take a firmer stance against China’s support for Hamas and Iran-backed terrorism, exposing the hypocrisy and repression that underpin its vision for a new global order.”