As Israel approaches the 75th anniversary of its creation while riven by domestic controversy, David Hazony compares it to other regimes that have suffered crises in what he terms their third generation. The United States fought a civil war 74 years after the ratification of the constitution; the USSR collapsed 74 years after the Bolshevik revolution. And the ancient kingdom of Israel, after its golden age under David and Solomon, was split in two during the reign of Solomon’s son. Yet, despite the deep divisions revealed by the question of judicial reform, Hazony is optimistic about the future of the present Jewish state:

The clash, if we are to be honest, is between two contradictory patriotic Israeli movements. Two different Jewish nationalisms, two forms of Zionism, relying on two different understandings of the word “democracy.” One seeks redress of injustice and counterrevolution, and to create an authentically Jewish state. The other wants to preserve the liberal order and the “light unto nations.” One sees the Jewish state as a “democracy” whose just powers of government derive from the consent of the governed; the other sees “democracy”—as expressed in rights, freedom, and equality—as inherent and non-negotiable elements of any Jewish state.

The Soviet Union crashed and burned because its citizens had long given up on the national dream of a beautiful future of equality through Communism. The United States fought a brutal Civil War that sacrificed the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans and required more than a decade of military occupation of the South, but which ultimately yielded a Second Founding, a national rebirth.

Israel can afford neither, and for this reason I am optimistic. Israel’s leaders, both government and opposition, have for the first time begun negotiating the contours of an “alternative reform”—which may actually be nothing less than a constitution for the Jewish state.

To me it is clear: Israel, the glorious miracle of Jewish rebirth, now celebrating its 75th independence day, is not nearing its end. On the contrary, it is just getting started.

In a recent article, the New York Times Magazine asserts that Benjamin Netanyahu “prolonged the war in Gaza to stay in power.” Niranjan Shankar takes the argument apart piece by piece, showing that for all its careful research, it fails to back up its basic claims. For instance: the article implies that Netanyahu torpedoed a three-point cease-fire proposal supported by the Biden administration in the spring of last year:

First of all, it’s crucial to note that Biden’s supposed “three-point plan” announced in May 2024 was originally an Israeli proposal. Of course, there was some back-and-forth and disagreement over how the Biden administration presented this initially, as Biden failed to emphasize that according to the three-point framework, a permanent cease-fire was conditional on Hamas releasing all of the hostages and stepping down. Regardless, the piece fails to mention that it was Hamas in June 2024 that rejected this framework!

It wasn’t until July 2024 that Hamas made its major concession—dropping its demand that Israel commit up front to a full end to the war, as opposed to doing so at a later stage of cease-fire/negotiations. Even then, U.S. negotiators admitted that both sides were still far from agreeing on a deal.

Even when the Times raises more credible criticisms of Israel—like when it brings up the IDF’s strategy of conducting raids rather than holding territory in the first stage of the war—it offers them in what seems like bad faith:

[W]ould the New York Times prefer that Israel instead started with a massive ground campaign with a “clear-hold-build” strategy from the get-go? Of course, if Israel had done this, there would have been endless criticism, especially under the Biden administration. But when Israel instead tried the “raid-and-clear” strategy, it gets blamed for deliberately dragging the war on.