Between 2006 and 2012, some 55,000 Africans—many of the Muslims, coming especially from Sudan and Eritrea—entered the Jewish state illegally via the Sinai Peninsula. Some fled war and famine; others merely sought opportunity. At the time, the influx of migrants caused much controversy, but since then the border has been sealed and the Israeli government arranged for about 20,000 to settle elsewhere. Of those who remain, some have become citizens and joined the IDF. Daniel Pipes revisits the episode, and what it suggests about changing Muslim attitudes toward Israel:

A Sudanese woman explained why she walked more than 200 miles across Egypt and the Sinai desert to the Israeli border: Egyptians “spit on us and called us monkeys and animals” while she heard that she would be treated well in Israel. And, indeed, she was: “they gave us chocolate and juice and handcuffed us.”

Muslim migrants abandoning their countries of origin, traveling long distances, enduring terrible experiences in Egypt, and taking a chance in the Jewish state unambiguously reveals a wide but covert appreciation of Israel. Far from the angry oratory of the United Nations or the insipid bigotry of the Middle East studies professoriate, large numbers of Muslims long to live among Zionists. As Malcolm Hedding of the International Christian Embassy in Jerusalem has noted, “It is remarkable that while some highly educated British academics consider Israel a racist and immoral country, these simple Sudanese refugees seem to know better.”

Thus do Muslim Africans desperate to reach the Jewish state point to an important aspect of Israel’s growing acceptance.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.