Since the beginning of Syria’s civil war in 2011, the IDF has carried out hundreds of attacks on hostile forces within the country—mostly airstrikes on Iranian positions or those of Iranian proxies. Jerusalem’s ability to identify precise targets and hit them seemingly at will, while maintaining near-zero casualties, suggests the sort of military supremacy normally associated with strategic success. Ehud Yaari is not so sure:

Israel’s short-term tactical calculations ignore the longer-term risks. Iran is determined to accept substantial losses in order to persist in its primary objective: deploying long- and medium-range missiles in Syria, complete with air-defense systems. So far, Iran has shied away from sending significant numbers of its own troops to Syria, preferring instead to send teams of . . . “advisors” to command mostly-Shiite militiamen and local recruits. In the future, under a new supreme leader and following modernization of its air force, Tehran may be prepared to raise the stakes.

The late commander of the Quds Force, [Iran’s elite expeditionary and terror-coordination unit], General Qassem Suleimani, conceived a plan to set up an Iranian-sponsored war machine on Syria’s territory including thousands of missile pads, fleets of UAVs, anti-aircraft batteries, and a chain of fortified positions along the Israeli border backed by a variety of intelligence-gathering installations. He was the first Middle Eastern leader with a detailed strategy of gradually strangling Israel.

The bottom line is clear. As long as [the Syrian dictator] Bashar al-Assad remains in power, Iran’s military build-up will gradually expand, acquiring more potential over time. Hopes that the West or the Arab states would offer Assad attractive incentives to break away from Iran’s embrace are wishful thinking. The close alliance between the two dates back to the 1970s and by now Iran has become a permanent feature of post-war Syria.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.