Since the beginning of Syria’s civil war in 2011, the IDF has carried out hundreds of attacks on hostile forces within the country—mostly airstrikes on Iranian positions or those of Iranian proxies. Jerusalem’s ability to identify precise targets and hit them seemingly at will, while maintaining near-zero casualties, suggests the sort of military supremacy normally associated with strategic success. Ehud Yaari is not so sure:

Israel’s short-term tactical calculations ignore the longer-term risks. Iran is determined to accept substantial losses in order to persist in its primary objective: deploying long- and medium-range missiles in Syria, complete with air-defense systems. So far, Iran has shied away from sending significant numbers of its own troops to Syria, preferring instead to send teams of . . . “advisors” to command mostly-Shiite militiamen and local recruits. In the future, under a new supreme leader and following modernization of its air force, Tehran may be prepared to raise the stakes.

The late commander of the Quds Force, [Iran’s elite expeditionary and terror-coordination unit], General Qassem Suleimani, conceived a plan to set up an Iranian-sponsored war machine on Syria’s territory including thousands of missile pads, fleets of UAVs, anti-aircraft batteries, and a chain of fortified positions along the Israeli border backed by a variety of intelligence-gathering installations. He was the first Middle Eastern leader with a detailed strategy of gradually strangling Israel.

The bottom line is clear. As long as [the Syrian dictator] Bashar al-Assad remains in power, Iran’s military build-up will gradually expand, acquiring more potential over time. Hopes that the West or the Arab states would offer Assad attractive incentives to break away from Iran’s embrace are wishful thinking. The close alliance between the two dates back to the 1970s and by now Iran has become a permanent feature of post-war Syria.

Information about a supposedly near-finalized hostage deal continued to trickle out yesterday. While it’s entirely possible that by the time you read this a deal will be much more certain, it is every bit as likely that it will have fallen through by then. More likely still, we will learn that there are indefinite and unspecified delays. Then there are the details: even in the best of scenarios, not all the hostages will be returned at once, and Israel will have to make painful concessions in exchange, including the release of hundreds of hardened terrorists and the withdrawal from key parts of the Gaza Strip.

Unusually—if entirely appropriately—the president-elect’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, has participated in the talks alongside members of President Biden’s team. Philip Klein examines the incoming Trump administration’s role in the process:

President-elect Trump has repeatedly warned that there would be “all hell to pay” if hostages were not returned from Gaza by the time he takes office. While he has never laid out exactly what the specific consequences for Hamas would be, there are some ominous signs that Israel is being pressured into paying a tremendous price.

There is obviously more here than we know. It’s possible that with the pressure from the Trump team came reassurances that Israel would have more latitude to reenter Gaza as necessary to go after Hamas than it would have enjoyed under Biden. . . . That said, all appearances are that Israel has been forced into making more concessions because Trump was concerned that he’d be embarrassed if January 20 came around with no hostages released.

While Donald Trump’s threats are a welcome rhetorical shift, part of the problem may be their vagueness. After all, it’s unlikely the U.S. would use military force to unleash hell in Gaza, or could accomplish much in doing so that the IDF can’t. More useful would be direct threats against countries like Qatar and Turkey that host Hamas, and threats to the persons and bank accounts of the Hamas officials living in those counties. Witkoff instead praised the Qatari prime minister for “doing God’s work” in the negotiations.”