In cooperation with Cypriot authorities, agents of the fabled Israeli intelligence service recently thwarted a planned attack on Israeli targets on the island nation, arresting several of the would-be perpetrators. After the arrests were made public, the Mossad took the unusual step of explaining how it found them: by abducting, on Iranian soil, the officer of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who directed the terrorist cell in Cyprus, and obtaining the relevant information from him. Yoav Limor notes some lessons that can be learned from this coup, among them:

[T[he Mossad has close collaborative endeavors with other intelligence agencies around the world, especially in the region. This helped in frustrating the terrorist plots in Istanbul and Georgia earlier this year and was helpful in the Cyprus operation as well. Such cooperation is a strategic asset of paramount importance that must be nurtured; it often runs along a parallel track to official ties with Israel.

Iran is hell-bent on killing Israelis. Last year the head of the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence apparatus lost his job after his plot to kill Israelis was thwarted in Istanbul; he was replaced by another one who now saw a similar outcome to his plot. The commanders get replaced but that Iranian motivation remains just the same, in part because Iran has not been forced to pay a price for its attempted murder of Israelis.

The final takeaway is that this intense Iranian effort has failed to cause any outrage around the world. The Mossad exposes plots, shows incriminating evidence and intelligence in practically every language, and shares it with key decision-makers and security chiefs in friendly and not-so-friendly countries, only to get a collective shrug in return.

To Peter Berkowitz, the rot in American institutions of higher learning exposed by Tuesday’s hearings resembles a disease that in its early stages was easy to cure but difficult to diagnose, and now is so advanced that it is easy to diagnose but difficult to cure. Recent analyses of these problems have now at last made it to the pages of the New York Times but are, he writes, “tardy by several decades,” and their suggested remedies woefully inadequate:

They fail to identify the chief problem. They ignore the principal obstacles to reform. They propose reforms that provide the equivalent of band-aids for gaping wounds and shattered limbs. And they overlook the mainstream media’s complicity in largely ignoring, downplaying, or dismissing repeated warnings extending back a quarter century and more—largely, but not exclusively, from conservatives—that our universities undermine the public interest by attacking free speech, eviscerating due process, and hollowing out and politicizing the curriculum.

The remedy, Berkowitz argues, would be turning universities into places that cultivate, encourage, and teach freedom of thought and speech. But doing so seems unlikely:

Having undermined respect for others and the art of listening by presiding over—or silently acquiescing in—the curtailment of dissenting speech for more than a generation, the current crop of administrators and professors seems ill-suited to fashion and implement free-speech training. Moreover, free speech is best learned not by didactic lectures and seminars but by practicing it in the reasoned consideration of competing ideas with those capable of challenging one’s assumptions and arguments. But where are the professors who can lead such conversations? Which faculty members remain capable of understanding their side of the argument because they understand the other side?